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 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) requires 
that a settlement that binds class members must be 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.” In this case, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld approval of a settlement that 
disposed of absentee class members’ claims while 
providing those class members no relief at all. Break-
ing with decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, Sev-
enth, and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the settlement’s award of $6.5 million to establish a 
new foundation controlled by the lead defendant and 
class counsel was a fair and adequate remedy under 
the trust-law doctrine of cy pres. The question pre-
sented is: 
 Whether, or in what circumstances, a cy pres 
remedy that provides no direct relief to class mem-
bers comports with the requirement of Rule 23(e)(2) 
that a settlement that binds class members must be 
“fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
 
 Petitioner Megan Marek was an objector in the 
district court proceedings and appellant in the court 
of appeals proceedings. 
 Respondents Sean Lane, Mohannaed Sheikha, 
Sean Martin, Ali Sammour, Mohammaed Zidan, Sara 
Karrow, Colby Henson, Denton Hunker, Firas 
Sheikha, Hassen Sheikha, Linda Stewart, Tina Tran, 
Matthew Smith, Erica Parnell, John Conway, Phillip 
Huerta, Alicia Hunker, Megan Lynn Hancock, a 
minor, by and through her parent Rebecca Holey, 
Austin Muhs, Catherine Harris, Mario Herrera, and 
Maryam Hosseiny were named plaintiffs in the 
district court proceedings and appellees in the court 
of appeals proceedings. 
 Respondents Facebook, Inc., Blockbuster, Inc., 
Fandango, Inc., Hotwire, Inc., STA Travel, Inc., 
Overstock.com, Inc., Zappos.com, Inc., and Gamefly, 
Inc. were defendants in the district court proceedings 
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 A $9.5 million class action settlement that 
awards absentee class members no relief at all – no 
money, no guarantee that defendants will not injure 
them in the exact same manner, not even coupons – is 
not “fair, reasonable, and adequate” by any measure. 
Yet the Ninth Circuit upheld such a settlement of 
class members’ claims because class counsel and the 
lead defendant agreed to use $6.5 million to establish 
a new foundation, controlled by the defendant and 
class counsel, that also does nothing to combat de-
fendants’ alleged conduct or redress class members’ 
alleged injuries. (The bulk of the remainder of the 
settlement proceeds, of course, went to class counsel 
as fees.) That award, it held, was the “next best 
distribution” of the settlement funds, short of provid-
ing actual payments to class members, and was 
therefore justified by the cy pres doctrine, which 
lower courts increasingly rely upon to direct class 
action settlement proceeds to third parties selected by 
attorneys or by the courts themselves. 
 For good reason, every other court of appeals to 
consider class action settlements containing similarly 
problematic cy pres awards has rejected them. See 
generally Sylvia Hsieh, Class Action Settlements Face 
Growing Scrutiny by Objectors, Courts, Lawyers 
USA, Mar. 31, 2013 (noting circuit split). Those 
courts’ decisions have recognized that cy pres awards 
require special scrutiny because they can facilitate 
tacit or explicit collusion between defendants, who 
are eager to settle at the lowest price and with a 
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minimum of fuss, and class counsel, who are seeking 
to maximize their fees and may be willing to accom-
modate defendants’ desires in exchange for a “clear 
sailing” agreement not to challenge the fee request. 
They recognize that, in this way, cy pres awards 
present a heightened risk of conflict between class 
counsel and their putative clients, the members of the 
class. They recognize that open-ended cy pres awards, 
such as to entities without a track record of service or 
those controlled by class counsel or defendants, may 
provide little or no benefit to class members. And 
above all else, they recognize that cy pres awards to 
third parties are not appropriate when any reasona-
ble opportunity remains to compensate class mem-
bers directly for their injuries – always the first-best 
use of settlement funds. 
 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this 
case brushed aside all such concerns. Addressing 
them, it said, would be “an intrusion into the private 
parties’ negotiations” and therefore “improper and 
disruptive to the settlement process.” App. 14. It is 
“unremarkable,” the court said, that a cy pres award 
may actually serve to advance the defendant’s inter-
ests. App. 16. Even the availability of $2,500 in 
statutory damages for some class members’ claims, it 
said, does not render a settlement that directs every 
last dollar to third parties or class counsel unfair in 
any respect. App. 18-19. All that matters is that a cy 
pres award “bears a substantial nexus to the interests 
of the class members,” App. 14, which in this case the 
court viewed broadly to encompass a campaign – 
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again, controlled in part by defendants – to educate 
the public about “user control” over Internet privacy, 
when class members’ complaint was that the defen-
dants had unlawfully denied them control over disclo-
sure of their personal information. 
 If allowed to stand, the circuit split created by 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates an enormous 
incentive for forum-shopping by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
seeking to sue and settle nationwide class actions like 
this one. Bringing suit within the Ninth Circuit’s 
footprint now guarantees that minor things like 
compensating class members for their injuries, hold-
ing defendants liable to the extent the law allows, 
and preventing defendants from injuring class mem-
bers in the exact same manner will not stand in the 
way of reaching a quick settlement to the mutual 
benefit of defendants and class counsel, at the ex-
pense of class counsel’s putative clients. The Court 
should grant certiorari to resolve this circuit conflict, 
provide guidance to the lower courts on the use of cy 
pres awards, and correct a serious abuse of the class 
action mechanism that puts the interests of those it is 
intended to benefit, class members, dead last. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 696 
F.3d 811 and reproduced at App. 1. The opinions of 
the United States District Court for the Northern 
4 
District of California are unpublished and reproduced 
at App. 48 and App. 63. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
JURISDICTION 
 The judgment of the court of appeals was entered 
on September 20, 2012. A timely petition for rehear-
ing en banc was denied on February 26, 2013. App. 
75. Justice Kennedy extended the time in which to 
file a petition for certiorari to and including July 26, 
2013. See No. 12A1112. This Court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). As a class member who 
objected to the settlement, Petitioner has standing to 
appeal the final judgment. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 
U.S. 1 (2002). 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
RULE INVOLVED 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2) provides, 
with respect to a proposed settlement: 
If the proposal would bind class members, 
the court may approve it only after a hearing 
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Cy Pres Doctrine in Class Action Set-
tlements 
 The cy pres doctrine originated in the law of 
trusts and estates. The term is short for the French 
“cy pres comme possible,” or “as near as possible.” 
Historically, it referred to a court’s power, typically 
under statute, to reform a trust or charitable gift that 
has become impossible to administer according to its 
terms. See generally Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian 
& Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Patholo-
gies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and 
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 625 (2010) 
[hereinafter “Redish”]. For example, a 19th-century 
court applied the doctrine to repurpose a trust that 
had been created to support the abolition movement 
to instead provide assistance to poor African Ameri-
cans. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867). 
 The application of the cy pres doctrine, or some-
thing resembling it, to class action settlements is a 
more recent phenomenon. The “most adventuresome” 
of the 1966 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was the addition of Rule 23(b)(3)’s provi-
sion for “class actions for damages designed to secure 
judgments binding all class members save those who 
affirmatively elected to be excluded.” Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-15 (1997). That 
provision empowered attorneys, armed with a few 
representative plaintiffs, to file actions on behalf of 
large and diffuse classes, aggregating members’ 
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paltry claims into litigation well worth an attorney’s 
time. When these suits prevail, whether through 
settlement or judgment, the proceeds typically flow 
into a fund out of which are made disbursements to 
individual class members. 
 It is a unique feature of opt-out class actions 
that, unlike in other civil litigation, funds often 
remain unclaimed, particularly where class members’ 
claims are small or the claims process is burdensome. 
“Traditionally, such funds would revert to a defendant 
– often an unpopular result because reversion of the 
funds undermines the deterrent effect of the suit and 
leaves the defendant largely with the benefit of his 
illegal activity.” Redish at 631. In the 1970s, the cy 
pres doctrine was proposed as a solution for this 
“problem” of unclaimed settlement funds that could 
achieve the “next best” result to compensation by 
indirectly compensating absentee class members, 
without undermining the deterrent effect of liability. 
Id. at 631-34. 
 The use of cy pres awards in class actions quickly 
moved beyond these modest origins to become an 
integral component of many settlements. In these 
cases, settlement agreements expressly provide for 
awards to charities or foundations in addition to, or 
in place of, funds earmarked for distribution to class 
members. Used in this fashion, cy pres awards facili-
tate the filing, certification, and settlement of class 
actions that would otherwise be infeasible to litigate 
due to unmanageability or questionable merit. Redish 
at 639-40; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 
7 
F.2d 179, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 
1973)). 
 As critics have documented, these types of cy pres 
awards “create the potential for conflicts of interest 
by ensuring that class attorneys are able to reap 
exorbitant fees regardless of whether the absent class 
members are adequately compensated.” John Beisner, 
Jessica Miller & Jordan Schwartz, Cy Pres: A Not So 
Charitable Contribution to Class Action Practice 13 
(2010) [hereinafter “Beisner”]. “Indeed, in many class 
actions it is solely the use of cy pres that assures 
distribution of a class settlement or award fund 
sufficiently large to guarantee substantial attorneys’ 
fees and to make the entire class proceeding seeming-
ly worthwhile.” Redish at 621. Despite these con-
cerns, the use of cy pres awards in class action 
settlements has grown quickly since the 1980s, 
accelerating sharply over the past decade. Id. at 653. 
The settlement at issue in the instant case is fairly 
representative of this trend. 
 
B. Facebook’s Beacon Program 
 Facebook operates the eponymous social net-
working website that millions of Americans (and 
more abroad) use to share updates on their lives with 
other users whom they have designated as “friends.” 
Facebook, in turn, earns money by selling advertising 
tailored to its members based on the information they 
have disclosed to the service. Thanks to this quid pro 
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quo – users trade personal information for access to 
the service – Facebook has been at the center of 
nearly every recent debate over technology’s impact 
on personal privacy. If anything, the company has 
courted controversy through frequent changes to its 
privacy policies and aggressive efforts to extract more 
information from its members to make its service 
more valuable to both them and its advertisers. 
 To date, the most controversial of those efforts 
was Facebook’s “Beacon” program, launched in No-
vember 2007. The idea of Beacon was to make every 
Facebook member a personal pitchman for approxi-
mately forty companies engaged in online commerce 
that had signed on to the program, including Block-
buster (movie rentals), Overstock.com (discount 
merchandise), and Zappos.com (shoes and apparel). 
Each company would send Facebook the details 
whenever a logged-in Facebook member made a 
purchase on its website. Facebook would then broad-
cast the details to that member’s friends – after all, 
what could be more persuasive than a personal 
endorsement from a trusted friend? Facebook, of 
course, would collect revenue from these intimate 
advertisements, while its members would have yet 
another thing to share and discuss with their friends 
on the service. 
 But Facebook’s members were less enthusiastic 
about Beacon than its advertisers. Almost immediate-
ly, members complained about all kinds of inadvert-
ent and sometimes embarrassing disclosures. Beacon 
was indiscriminate, for example, in broadcasting 
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news that a member had rented a blockbuster movie 
versus racier fare. It spoiled gifts by broadcasting not 
only that they had been purchased, but also whether 
they had been bought on sale or from a discounter. 
Thanks to Beacon, spouses learned of their signifi-
cant others’ stinginess in spending on presents and 
pricy self-indulgences, each of which probably caused 
less friction than indulgent purchases apparently 
intended for others, which Beacon equally revealed. 
 The cause of these unintended disclosures was 
that, to encourage uptake, Facebook had made Bea-
con an opt-out program and then made it exceedingly 
difficult for its members to opt out. Doing so “required 
video game skills”: “The user would get a pop-up on 
his screen asking whether he wanted to opt out, but 
the pop-up would disappear in about ten seconds. Too 
slow reading the pop-up or clicking the mouse, and all 
a user’s ‘friends’ would know exactly what he had 
bought.” App. 27-28. Accustomed to dismissing intru-
sive pop-ups almost automatically, many Facebook 
members were unaware that their purchases would 
be broadcast to their Facebook friends and never 
knew that there was any way to opt out. 
 A few weeks after launching Beacon, Facebook 
gave in to its members’ demands and made Beacon 
opt-in. In this version of the program, purchases on 
partner websites remained private unless a member 
authorized Facebook to publicize them. Unsurprising-
ly, given all the negative publicity, Beacon usage 
waned among members and advertisers. In Septem-
ber 2009, Facebook shuttered the program altogether, 
10 
and Facebook’s CEO later declared the entire episode 
a “mistake.”1 
 
C. The District Court Approves a Settlement 
That Provides No Relief to Class Members, 
Only a Cy Pres Award 
 In August 2008, nineteen plaintiffs filed a puta-
tive class action in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California against Face-
book and its Beacon advertising partners, alleging 
violations of various federal and California privacy 
and consumer protection statutes. Notably, one of 
those statutes, the Video Privacy Protection Act – 
enacted in response to the disclosure of Judge Robert 
Bork’s video rental records – provides liquidated 
damages of $2,500 for the disclosure of a consumer’s 
video rental and sale records without his or her 
“informed, written consent.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2008). 
The complaint challenged only the earlier opt-out 
version of Beacon, which had been curtailed nearly a 
year before, and not the revised opt-in program. 
 Before the district court had a chance to rule on 
Facebook’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims, 
the parties entered into settlement negotiations. In 
September 2009, they submitted a settlement agree-
ment for the court’s approval. That agreement provided 
 
 1 Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook 
Community, The Facebook Blog (Nov. 29, 2011), https://blog. 
facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131. 
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that Facebook would pay $9.5 million to a settlement 
fund in exchange for a release of class members’ 
claims. At the same time, it dramatically expanded 
the class to include Facebook members who might 
have claims relating to the opt-out version of Beacon, 
and provided for certification of this expanded class. 
Facebook and its advertisers would thereby be im-
munized against all future claims regarding Beacon. 
 Other than “incentive payments” of a few thou-
sand apiece to the named plaintiffs, class members 
would receive no compensation at all. Instead, ap-
proximately $6.5 million of the settlement fund would 
be used to establish a new grant-making organization 
called the Digital Trust Foundation (“DTF”), with a 
mission to “fund and sponsor programs designed to 
educate users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding 
critical issues relating to protection of identity and 
personal information online through user control, and 
the protection of users from online threats.” App. 6. 
This foundation would be run by a three-member 
board of directors selected by Facebook and class 
counsel. The initial board consisted of Facebook’s 
chief lobbyist, a journalist who already served on 
Facebook’s “Safety Advisory Board,” and a law profes-
sor. 
 Class counsel and Facebook agreed that attorney 
fees would be drawn out of the settlement fund. 
Facebook also agreed not to oppose an attorneys’ fee 
claim of up to $3,166,667, or one-third of the fund. 
App. 32. Ultimately, the district court awarded 
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$2,364,973 in fees and expenses, twice the alleged 
lodestar. App. 67. 
 The settlement also provided that Facebook 
would end the moribund “Beacon” program, which 
Facebook did months before the district court acted 
on the proposed settlement. But, as class counsel 
explained to the district court, Facebook refused to 
sign off on any agreement “limiting their future 
actions as a corporation,” and it would agree only to 
terminate “the program launched by Facebook on 
November 6, 2007 and all iterations thereof bearing 
the ‘Beacon’ name.” App. 31-32. Facebook therefore 
“remained free to do what it had done before, under a 
different name.” App. 32. 
 The district court certified the class and approved 
the settlement over the Petitioner’s objection that it 
was not “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” as required 
by Rule 23(e)(2), because it awarded class members 
nothing while providing millions in dubious cy pres 
“relief” and millions in attorneys’ fees. The court 
agreed with class counsel that “the immediate bene-
fits represented by the Settlement outweighed the 
possibility – perhaps remote – of obtaining a better 
result at trial.” App. 58. As for the availability of 
liquidated damages for violation of the Video Privacy 
Protection Act and other statutes, the court said only 
that those claims “implicate factual issues that would 
likely be vigorously disputed” and that the court was 
not aware of “any cases in which plaintiffs have been 
awarded multiple liquidated damages.” App. 55. On 
that basis, the court concluded that the proposed cy 
13 
pres award, establishment of the DTF, “provides more 
meaningful relief to the Class” than would litigation 
seeking statutory damages. App. 59. 
 The court also rejected objections that the set-
tlement created a new organization, in a field that is 
far from underserved, and placed its control in the 
hands of the defendant and class counsel. The objec-
tors, it said, had failed to make a “persuasive showing 
that the Foundation will be a mere publicity tool for 
Facebook, or in any meaningful sense under Face-
book’s direct control.” App. 61. Regardless, such 
arguments, it said, are “beyond the purview of the 
Court” because parties are free to structure their own 
settlements. App. 61. 
 
D. A Split Panel of the Ninth Circuit Affirms 
 In affirming approval of the settlement, the 
Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the district court’s 
reasoning. To begin with, it denied that the cy pres 
doctrine requires “settling parties [to] select a cy pres 
recipient that the court or class members would find 
ideal. On the contrary, such an intrusion into the 
private parties’ negotiations would be improper and 
disruptive to the settlement process.” App. 14. In-
stead, it explained, the district should approve a class 
action settlement containing a cy pres award if “it 
bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class 
members.” App. 14. 
 Here, it held, that requirement was satisfied 
because the “distribution of settlement funds to 
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entities that promote the causes of online privacy and 
security will benefit absent class members and fur-
ther the purposes of the privacy statutes that form 
the basis for the class-plaintiffs’ lawsuit.” App. 15. 
 The panel majority rejected each of the objectors’ 
challenges to the adequacy of the settlement. First, 
even while recognizing that some class members may 
“have successful claims for $2,500 in statutory dam-
ages under the VPPA,” it reasoned that not all class 
members had such claims and that the total settle-
ment amount, $9.5 million, “was substantial in this 
case” and therefore adequate “to the class as a 
whole.” App. 21 (emphasis in original). In any case, it 
held, paying out to class members the $6.5 million 
that remained after fees and costs would be “ ‘burden-
some’ and inefficient” because “each class member’s 
recovery under a direct distribution would be de 
minimis.” App. 23. It did not address that these 
factors – the size of the fund, the number of class 
members, the absence of subclasses – were compo-
nents of the settlement itself. 
 Second, the panel majority saw no problem that 
the recipient of settlement funds would be controlled, 
in part, by the defendant. It was only understanda-
ble, the court explained, that Facebook “insisted on 
preserving its role in the process of selecting the 
organizations that would receive a share of that 
substantial settlement fund. . . . so as to ensure that 
the funds will not be used in a way that harms Face-
book.” App. 16. For the district court to question  
this aspect of the cy pres award would have been to 
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“undermine” the parties’ negotiations and impermis-
sible “second-guessing [of] the parties’ decision.” App. 
16. 
 Third, the panel majority was also untroubled by 
the settlement’s creation of a new organization with 
no record of service that would at least suggest likely 
benefit to absentee class members. It was enough, the 
court said, that DTF has a mission statement, which 
“tell[s] us exactly how funds will be used.” App. 17. 
That mission, in turn, “bears a direct and substantial 
nexus to the interests of absent class members.” App. 
15. The court dismissed concerns that the organiza-
tion might not carry out its stated mission as “unsup-
ported speculation.” App. 17 n.4. 
 Finally, the panel majority rejected the objection 
that the settlement’s provision for Beacon’s termina-
tion provided no benefit to class members as moot 
because it was enough that “the $9.5 [sic] settlement 
award substantially furthers the interests of the 
class.” App. 24. 
 Having bulldozed every objection, the panel 
majority affirmed the district court’s holding that a 
settlement that provided no direct relief to class 
members, only a questionable cy pres award, was 
“fundamentally fair.” App. 25. 
 Judge Kleinfeld dissented, arguing that the 
“settlement perverts the class action into a device for 
depriving victims of remedies for wrongs, while 
enriching both the wrongdoers and the lawyers 
purporting to represent the class.” App. 27. The class 
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action procedure, he explained, “has obvious at-
tendant risks, because class counsel’s ‘clients’ are not 
clients at all in the traditional sense; they do not hire 
the lawyer, they do not agree on a fee with him, and 
they do not control whether he settles their case. 
They are in no position to prevent class counsel from 
pursuing his own interests at their expense.” App. 34. 
 Cy pres awards only accentuate these risks 
because they can facilitate the “pursuit of self-
interest rather than the class’s interests.” App. 44. In 
particular: 
A defendant may prefer a cy pres award to a 
damages award, for the public relations ben-
efit. And the larger the cy pres award, the 
easier it is to justify a larger attorneys’ fees 
award. The incentive for collusion may be 
even greater where, as here, there is nothing 
to stop Facebook and class counsel from 
managing the charity to serve their interests 
and pay salaries and consulting fees to per-
sons they choose. 
App. 45. 
 To prevent that result, Judge Kleinfeld ex-
plained, “the district court must ensure that a cy pres 
award targets the plaintiff class.” App. 45. Here, 
however, the district court failed to do so. There was 
no “established record of performance by the charity 
of acts beneficial to people in the wronged class.” App. 
46. Indeed, “an ‘educational program’ amounting to 
an advertising campaign for Facebook” would appear 
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to satisfy DTF’s court-approved mission statement. 
App. 46. 
 The only apparent benefit of the cy pres award in 
this case, Judge Kleinfeld concluded, was to aid 
Facebook and class counsel in facilitating a collusive 
settlement between the lead defendant and class 
counsel. As for any benefit to class members, the most 
that could be said “is that in exchange for giving up 
any claims they may have, the exposed Facebook 
users get the satisfaction of contributing to a charity 
to be funded by Facebook, partially controlled by 
Facebook, and advised by a legal team consisting of 
Facebook’s counsel and their own purported counsel 
whom they did not hire and have never met.” App. 47. 
 The court subsequently denied panel rehearing, 
over Judge Kleinfeld’s dissent, and denied rehearing 
en banc, over the dissent of Judge Milan Smith, 
joined by Chief Judge Kozinski, and Judges 
O’Scannlain, Bybee, Bea, and Ikuta. App. 75. Judge 
Smith protested that the cy pres award here failed to 
“(1) be reasonably certain to benefit the class, and  
(2) advance the objectives of the statutes relied upon 
in bringing suit.” App. 76. Instead, under the panel 
opinion’s approach, “an open-ended, one-sentence 
mission statement is all it takes to earn cy pres 
settlement approval.” App. 78. Worse still, that mis-
sion bore little relationship to the wrongs alleged by 
the plaintiffs, because no amount of education on 
privacy protection though “user control” could “teach 
users how to protect themselves from Facebook’s 
deliberate misconduct” in wrongfully disclosing 
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personal information they had already shared with 
Facebook. App. 80. 
 As a result, Judge Smith concluded, “this case 
creates a significant loophole in our case law that will 
confuse litigants and judges, while endorsing cy pres 
settlements that in no way benefit class members.” 
App. 76.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
 This petition presents an ideal and timely oppor-
tunity for the Court to resolve a circuit split over the 
use of cy pres awards in class action settlements and 
provide much-needed guidance to the lower courts on 
a recurring issue of substantial importance. 
 
I. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Squarely 
Conflicts with the Decisions of Other Cir-
cuits Limiting the Use of Cy Pres Awards 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with nu-
merous decisions of the other circuits on the funda-
mental question of when it is “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate” for a class action settlement to award 
money not to class members but to third parties 
unconnected to the litigation. This Court’s interven-
tion is warranted to establish a nationwide standard 
for the use of cy pres awards in class action settle-
ments and thereby prevent counsel bringing nation-
wide class actions from shopping for forums that 
provide their putative clients the weakest protections 
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against collusive settlements facilitated by cy pres 
awards. 
 A. The most fundamental conflict created by the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision concerns whether a cy pres 
distribution is appropriate and should be treated as 
equivalent to direct monetary recovery in determin-
ing the fairness of a settlement, especially when the 
defendant indirectly benefits from the cy pres award. 
On this point, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict 
with decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, and Sev-
enth Circuits. 
 1. The Third Circuit has emphasized that the 
critical factor in evaluating a proposed settlement 
containing a cy pres award is “whether the settlement 
provides sufficient direct benefit to the class,” i.e., 
money compensation. In re Baby Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, the 
district court must consider things like “the number 
of individual awards compared to both the number of 
claims and the estimated number of class members, 
the size of the individual awards compared to claim-
ants’ estimated damages, and the claims process used 
to determine individual awards” before it may ap-
prove such a settlement. Id. at 174. The district court 
has an obligation to “affirmatively seek out such 
information.” Id. And having made such findings, the 
district court must then determine whether the 
“compensation going directly to class members” is 
sufficient. Id. at 176. 
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 Cy pres awards, it explained, are no substitute 
for direct compensation: 
The private causes of action aggregated in 
this class action – as in many others – were 
created by Congress to allow plaintiffs to re-
cover compensatory damages for their inju-
ries. Cy pres distributions imperfectly serve 
that purpose by substituting for that direct 
compensation an indirect benefit that is at 
best attenuated and at worse illusory. Cy 
pres distributions also present a potential 
conflict of interest between class counsel and 
their clients because the inclusion of a cy 
pres distribution may increase a settlement 
fund, and with it attorneys’ fees, without in-
creasing the direct benefit to the class. 
Where a court fears counsel is conflicted, it 
should subject the settlement to increased 
scrutiny. 
Id. at 173 (citations and footnote omitted).  
 Applying such scrutiny, the court vacated a class 
action settlement that awarded only $3 million of a 
$35 million settlement to a class of consumers who 
alleged that they had paid inflated prices for baby 
products due to unlawful collusion, with the remain-
der going to charity as a cy pres award. This distribu-
tion was due, in large part, to the structure of the 
settlement, which required class members seeking more 
than a $5 award to submit extensive documentation. 
As a result, even class members who had suffered 
overcharges of $50 or more, and would be entitled 
by the Clayton Act to treble damages, had no real 
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incentive to file claims. Id. at 176. “Class members 
are not indifferent to whether funds are distributed to 
them or to cy pres recipients, and class counsel should 
not be either.” Id. at 178. Accordingly, the court 
remanded the case for the district court to “determine 
whether the class received sufficient direct benefit to 
justify the settlement as fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate.” Id. at 176. Accord In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2010) (vacating 
and remanding approval of a class action settlement 
involving a cy pres award of excess funds because the 
district court had no factual basis to determine 
whether a cap on individual awards to class members 
was reasonable based on class members’ likely recov-
ery in litigation).2 
 By contrast, the settlement approval affirmed by 
the Ninth Circuit makes no attempt to estimate the 
value of class members’ claims before approving a cy 
pres award that entirely depletes the settlement fund. 
Instead, it simply accepts class counsel’s conclusion 
that the settlement outweighs any possibility of 
recovery through actual litigation, App. 58, and 
assumes that class members would be entitled to only 
“de minimis amounts,” App. 59, despite the availability 
 
 2 See also Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d at 363 n.4 (Weis, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (citing the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.07 (2010) (“ALI 
Principles”) for the recommendation that “courts make numer-
ous inquiries as to the viability of additional payments to the 
class before consideration of the cy pres remedy”). 
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of statutory liquidated damages for some class mem-
bers that are far more than de minimis. In this way, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts with the Third 
Circuit’s requirement that district courts scrutinize 
whether a settlement provides adequate direct com-
pensation to class members before authorizing a cy 
pres award of excess funds. 
 2. Similar to the Third Circuit, the Seventh 
Circuit has held that a settlement that denies all 
direct relief to class members, in favor of a cy pres 
remedy, can be justified only if “careful scrutiny 
indicated that the class had no realistic prospect of 
sufficient success to enable an actual distribution to 
the class members.” Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 
356 F.3d 781, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2004). “Because class 
actions are rife with potential conflicts of interest 
between class counsel and class members, district 
judges presiding over such actions are expected to 
give careful scrutiny to the terms of proposed settle-
ments in order to make sure that class counsel are 
behaving as honest fiduciaries for the class as a 
whole.” Id. at 785 (citations omitted). 
 On that basis, the court reversed approval of a 
settlement that relied on the doctrine of cy pres to 
deny direct compensation to a subclass of mortgage-
holders whose bank had transmitted their financial 
information to telemarketing companies selling 
dubious financial services. Class counsel and defen-
dants maintained that the settlement amount was too 
little, and the subclass too large, for distributions to 
its members. Its members, they argued, received a cy 
23 
pres benefit from additional distributions to members 
of a smaller subclass of mortgage-holders who had 
actually purchased financial services from the tele-
marketers, because that remedy promoted deterrence 
and carried out the purpose of the consumer-
protection statutes underlying their claims. 
 The court met that argument with incredulity: 
Would it be too cynical to speculate that 
what may be going on here is that class 
counsel wanted a settlement that would give 
them a generous fee and Fleet wanted a set-
tlement that would extinguish 1.4 million 
claims against it at no cost to itself? The set-
tlement that the district judge approved sold 
these 1.4 million claimants down the river. 
Only if they had no claim – more precisely no 
claim large enough to justify a distribution to 
them – did they lose nothing by the settle-
ment, and the judge made no finding that 
they had no such claim. 
Id. 
 The court of appeals reversed the district court’s 
approval of the settlement and remanded with in-
structions for it to estimate the value of the subclass’s 
claims and reconsider the settlement’s fairness to 
class members. Accord Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage 
Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting, on 
identical grounds, a revised settlement that also de-
nied the subclass any direct relief, while awarding 
funds to various charities). 
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 The settlement approval affirmed by the Ninth 
Circuit certainly never found that class members 
“had no claim,” even as it endorsed a settlement that 
sold them down the river by extinguishing their 
claims without any direct compensation, only a cy 
pres award to a third party. To the contrary, both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit recognized that at 
least some class members had potentially valuable 
claims for statutory liquidated damages. App. 59, 21. 
For that reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision conflicts 
with the Seventh Circuit’s in Mirfasihi. 
 3. Reasoning that “settlement-fund proceeds, 
having been generated by the value of the class 
members’ claims, belong solely to the class members,” 
the Fifth Circuit has held that a cy pres award is 
permissible “only if it is not possible” to compensate 
class members directly. Klier v. Elf Autochem N. Am., 
Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 474-75 & nn.15, 16 (5th Cir. 2011). 
It therefore rejected a cy pres award of excess funds 
that had been allocated to one subclass, where mem-
bers of another subclass had not been fully compen-
sated for their injuries caused by exposure to arsenic 
and other toxins. Id. at 478-79. Cy pres awards, it 
said, are not permitted outside of the narrow circum-
stance where “it is not possible to put those funds to 
their very best use: benefitting the class members 
directly.” Id. at 475. Chief Judge Edith Jones con-
curred, arguing that cy pres awards should be strong-
ly disfavored due to the inevitable conflicts of interest 
and abuses associated with application of the doctrine 
to class action settlements. Id. at 480-81. 
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 The Second Circuit has held essentially the same 
as the Fifth, directing a district court to ensure that 
class members “have been compensated for their 
actual losses” before considering a cy pres award. 
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 
423, 436 (2d Cir. 2007). See also In re Pharm. Indus. 
Average Wholesale Price Litig., 588 F.3d 24, 35 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (endorsing a district court’s insistence that 
a “settlement pay class members treble damages [as 
provided by the underlying statute] before any money 
is distributed through cy pres”). 
 The opinion below conflicts with Klier and Mas-
ters because it authorizes cy pres relief where provid-
ing additional direct compensation to at least some 
class members was possible. In that respect, Klier 
and Masters are also in conflict with the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Baby Products. 708 F.3d at 173-74. 
 B. The Ninth Circuit’s decision also creates a 
circuit split regarding the required nexus between a 
cy pres award and class members’ interests. On this 
point, the Ninth Circuit is now in conflict with the 
Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 
 The American Law Institute recommends that cy 
pres awards, when otherwise appropriate, go to 
“recipient[s] whose interests reasonably approximate 
those being pursued by the class” and lists that as an 
absolute requirement for settlements that deny class 
members any direct compensation. ALI Principles 
§ 3.07. In general, the courts of appeals have adopted 
this as a baseline requirement for approval of cy pres 
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awards. See In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing ALI 
Principles and listing cases). 
 Applying that rule, the Eighth Circuit invalidat-
ed a cy pres award to the National Association for 
Public Interest Law from excess funds remaining 
after the settlement of antitrust claims against the 
major airlines because the award was not tailored “to 
the nature of the underlying lawsuit.” In re Airline 
Ticket Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 683 (8th 
Cir. 2002). The evidence and the district court’s 
findings had shown that the airlines colluded to cap 
commissions available to travel agents in Alaska, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, but 
only agents in Alaska and Hawaii had been compen-
sated. Id. Accordingly, “travel agencies in Puerto Rico 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands were clearly the next best 
recipients of the funds” that remained after the class 
of Alaskan and Hawaiian agents had been fully 
compensated, not a generic ‘public interest’ organiza-
tion. Id. 
 Applying similar logic, the Seventh Circuit 
invalidated a settlement agreement, in a nationwide 
antitrust class action, featuring a cy pres distribution 
to local law schools and directed the district court to 
“consider to some degree a broader nationwide use of 
its cy pres discretion.” Houck v. Folding Carton Ad-
min. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 502 (7th Cir. 1989). Previ-
ously, the same court had disapproved of an earlier cy 
pres award in the case that would have established a 
private antitrust research foundation because “[t]here 
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has already been voluminous research” on the subject 
and so additional funding would not achieve the 
class’s interests. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 
744 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 The Second Circuit has adopted an even stricter 
standard than the Seventh and Eighth, requiring 
that a cy pres award actually advance class members’ 
interests. Eisen, 479 F.2d 1005, vacated and remand-
ed on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Applying 
that standard in a later case, it approved the estab-
lishment of a “class assistance foundation . . . to fund 
projects and services that will benefit the entire 
class,” consisting of persons who had been exposed to 
Agent Orange. Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 184-85 
(quotation marks omitted) (discussing Eisen). Key 
was that the foundation’s benefits would flow to “the 
class that claims injury from Agent Orange,” not 
third parties. Id. at 185. 
 As described in Judge Smith’s dissent from 
denial of rehearing en banc, the cy pres award in this 
case does not at all “approximate” class members’ 
interests. See App. 77-78. The class complained that 
Facebook and its advertising partners wrongfully 
exposed members’ private information “in ways that 
even educated users cannot anticipate, prevent, or 
direct,” in violation of numerous statutory require-
ments. App. 79. By contrast, the cy pres recipient 
proposes to fund public education on protecting 
Internet privacy through “user control,” App. 6, which 
is the very thing that Facebook and its partners 
denied to class members, causing their injuries. 
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While education on “user control” may further Face-
book’s interests – certainly more so than research and 
public awareness campaigns critical of privacy abuses 
by service providers like Facebook – it does absolutely 
nothing to advance anything like class members’ 
interests, and it certainly does not benefit them. For 
that reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is in conflict 
with ALI’s ‘approximate interest’ standard, conflicts 
with decisions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits 
applying that standard, and falls far short of the 
Second Circuit’s more rigorous ‘actual benefit’ stan-
dard. 
 C. Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision also 
splits with the Second Circuit’s decision in Agent 
Orange and First Circuit’s decision in Lupron regard-
ing the duty of the district court to supervise the 
administration of an open-ended cy pres award to 
ensure that it achieves its intended purpose. Al-
though approving of the idea of a grant-making “class 
assistance program,” the Second Circuit held that the 
“district court must . . . designate and supervise, 
perhaps through a special master, the specific pro-
grams that will consume the settlement proceeds.” 
818 F.2d at 185. The power to pick and choose reme-
dies paid for with class members’ money, it explained, 
belongs to the district court alone, and “there is no 
principle of law authorizing such a broad delegation 
of judicial authority to private parties.” Id. And there 
could be “no assurance that [a] self-governing and 
self-perpetuating board of directors . . . will possess 
the independent, disinterested judgment required to 
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allocate limited funds to benefit the class as a whole.” 
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Instead, “only direct 
judicial supervision can assure that the settlement 
fund is expended for appropriate purposes.” Id. at 
186. Accord Lupron, 677 F.3d at 38-39 (modifying cy 
pres order to include annual audit requirement). But 
see Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 181 (endorsing cy pres 
distribution to third parties to be named later with-
out new notice to the class and suggesting that class 
members might intervene later to challenge improper 
distributions). 
 By contrast, the settlement upheld by the Ninth 
Circuit vests all control over the disbursement of 
class members’ funds in a three-member board of 
directors controlled by the defendant and class coun-
sel. There is absolutely no reason to believe that this 
board, which includes Facebook’s chief lobbyist, will 
exercise “independent, disinterested judgment” or 
that it will allocate funds “to benefit the class as a 
whole” – indeed, its mission is unrelated to any class 
members’ benefit. See App. 41-42. 
 Moreover, by permitting a cy pres award to a 
Facebook-affiliated foundation, the Ninth Circuit 
rejects the ALI Principles’ requirement that cy pres 
recipients have no “significant prior affiliation with 
the intended recipient that would raise substantial 
questions about whether the award was made on the 
merits.” ALI Principles § 3.07 cmt. (b); cf. Lupron, 677 
F.3d at 36-37. 
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II. The Question Presented Is Important and 
Frequently Recurring 
 Having long recognized that Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out 
class actions are an “adventuresome” innovation 
fraught with potential conflicts, e.g., Amchem, 521 
U.S. at 614, 625-26, in recent terms the Court has 
policed abuses of this procedural mechanism to skirt 
the limitations of substantive law, e.g., Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011), 
and to undermine class members’ rights, e.g., Stan-
dard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 
(2013). The availability of cy pres relief only accentu-
ates these pathologies of the class-action procedure by 
facilitating settlements that provide substantial 
benefits to defendants and class counsel, often at the 
expense of class members. Not only does this case 
present the Court with an opportunity to resolve a 
circuit split with nationwide implications, it would 
also further the Court’s efforts to ensure that the 
lower courts appropriately enforce the requirements 
of Rule 23. 
 A. The unfettered use of cy pres awards has 
been subject to substantial criticism by courts and 
scholars alike. They have identified at least five 
specific concerns regarding the type of cy pres award 
upheld in this case. 
 1. As in this case, cy pres awards typically fail 
to redress class members’ alleged injuries. Judge 
Richard Posner stated the problem plainly: “There is 
no indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s 
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giving the money to someone else.” Mirfasihi, 356 
F.3d at 784. Yet settlements that do just that are 
disturbingly routine. For example, in exchange for 
their claims that major music labels engaged in 
unlawful price-fixing, class members received cou-
pons for discounts on further CD purchases, while all 
settlement funds went to pay attorneys’ fees and to 
make a cy pres award to the National Guild of Com-
munity Schools of the Arts to develop an arts-related 
website. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised 
Price Antitrust Litig., No. 2:00MD1361-PH, 2005 WL 
1923446, at *3 (D. Me. Aug. 9, 2005). According to the 
district court, this award actually benefitted class 
members by promoting the “development of future 
musical artists.” Id. 
 Even worse was a settlement resolving challeng-
es to Google’s unauthorized disclosure of its users’ 
email contacts when it launched its “Buzz” social 
network. Class members – some of whom had suf-
fered disclosures that aided stalkers, jeopardized 
confidential journalist sources, or hinted at affairs – 
received no part of the $8.5 million settlement, while 
class counsel received over $2 million and the re-
mainder was divided among fourteen charities, 
including the local YMCA and the Brookings Institu-
tion – and, by the sua sponte order of the district 
court, a center at a university where the district court 
judge taught as a visiting professor at its law school.3 
 
 3 While not present in this case, the problem of cy pres 
being designated for local charities at the expense of a national 
(Continued on following page) 
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In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. C 10-00672 JW, 
2011 WL 7460099, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011); 
Pamela A. MacLean, Competing for Leftovers, Cali-
fornia Lawyer 15 (Sept. 2011). See also In re Netflix 
Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV-00379 EJD, 2013 WL 
1120801 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (relying on the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the instant case to justify a 
$9 million settlement that denied class members any 
monetary compensation, instead directing funds to 
various charitable organizations); SEC v. Bear, 
Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (collecting numerous cases where cy pres 
awards in class action settlements “stray[ed] far from 
the ‘next best use’ ”). 
 If “funds generated through the aggregate prose-
cution of divisible claims are presumptively the 
property of the class members,” ALI Principles § 3.07 
cmt. (b) – something that would unquestionably be 
the case had class members pursued individual 
litigation under the same substantive law – it is at 
 
class is also persistent. Compare Houck, 881 F.2d at 502 (reject-
ing cy pres designated for local law schools and remanding for 
“broader nationwide use”), with, e.g., Perkins, infra, and In re 
Easysaver Rewards Litig., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 09-cv-2094 
AJB (WVG), 2013 WL 435032 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013) ($3 million 
to local San Diego schools including alma mater of counsel for 
both parties); see generally Sam Yospe, Note, Cy Pres Distribu-
tions in Class Action Settlements, 2009 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
1014, 1030-31; Examination of Litigation Abuse: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Mar. 13, 2013) (written 
testimony of Theodore H. Frank). 
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the least troubling that some lower courts claim the 
discretion to distribute that property to third parties 
before class members have been compensated and, 
more generally, to approve settlements structured so 
as to stymie or preclude class members’ recovery. 
 2. Cy pres awards drive a wedge between the 
interests of class members and their putative counsel. 
The chief problem is that, when attorneys settle a 
class action, they are negotiating both their own fees 
and class recovery. But cy pres awards divorce attor-
neys’ fees (typically based on the total value of the 
settlement) from their clients’ recovery, “ensuring 
that class attorneys are able to reap exorbitant fees 
regardless of whether the absent class members are 
adequately compensated.” Beisner at 13. Thus, class 
counsel are financially indifferent as to whether a 
settlement is structured to compensate their clients 
or direct settlement proceeds to third parties. In some 
cases, class counsel may actually prefer a cy pres 
award that advances their own interests, such as by 
funding the development of future litigation, making 
a sizable donation to counsel’s alma mater, or even 
both. See, e.g., Ashley Roberts, Law School Gets $5.1 
Million to Fund New Center, GW Hatchet, Dec. 3, 
2007 (describing $5.1 million cy pres award to George 
Washington University School of Law to create a 
“Center for Competition Law”). 
 Arguably, “[b]y disincentivizing class attorneys 
from vigorously pursuing individualized compensa-
tion for absent class members, cy pres threatens the 
due process rights of those class members.” Redish at 
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650 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45-46 
(1940), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring adequa-
cy of representation)). 
 3. Defendants, facing no resistance from class 
counsel, use cy pres awards to structure settlements 
to minimize costs or even benefit themselves. Such 
awards create the illusion of relief that can “increase 
the likelihood and absolute amount of attorneys’ fees 
awarded without directly, or even indirectly, benefit-
ting the plaintiff.” Redish at 661. Google and Face-
book, for example, have directed cy pres awards in 
privacy-breach cases to the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation, a nonprofit that “is often an ally of Google and 
Facebook when it comes to staving off liability to 
rights holders over user-generated infringing content” 
and on other public policy issues. Roger Parloff, 
Google and Facebook’s New Tactic in the Tech Wars, 
CNNMoney, July 30, 2012; see also MacLean, supra, 
at 15 (noting that Google Buzz settlement distributed 
cy pres to six charities Google had given money to in 
previous year). At the same time, those companies 
have apparently vetoed awards to privacy-focused 
nonprofits that they view as “too aggressively devoted 
to combatting the wrongs that allegedly harmed the 
class.” Parloff, supra. 
 Even if Google and Facebook ultimately receive 
no direct benefit from these awards, they still are 
able to take credit for their charity. See Molski v. 
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (observing 
that “it seems somewhat distasteful to allow a corpo-
ration to fulfill its legal and equitable obligations 
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through tax-deductible donations to third parties”); 
Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867-68 (9th Cir. 
2012) (noting that cy pres awards that overlap with 
charitable gifts to which the defendant has already 
committed are a “paper tiger,” in terms of deterrence). 
 In the instant case, Facebook stands to benefit by 
funding a public education campaign that emphasizes 
users’ ability to block disclosure of personal infor-
mation, while commensurately minimizing the per-
ceived risk of disclosure due to the actions of services 
like Facebook. And that is a best-case scenario; as 
Judge Kleinfeld explained, “For all we know [the 
DTF] will fund nothing but an ‘educational program’ 
amounting to an advertising campaign for Facebook.” 
App. 46. Nothing in the settlement forbids it. 
 4. The Second Circuit has expressed concern 
that the availability of cy pres relief “would have 
allowed plaintiffs to satisfy the manageability re-
quirements of Rule 23 where they otherwise could 
not.” Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 185. This, in turn, 
“would have induced plaintiffs to pursue ‘doubtful’ 
class claims for ‘astronomical amounts’ and thereby 
‘generate . . . leverage and pressure on defendants to 
settle.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Eisen, 479 
F.2d at 1019). In this way, cy pres incentivizes both 
the bringing of ‘strike suits’ and their settlement on 
terms mutually agreeable to class counsel and the 
defendant. Cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (stating that 
the Rule 23 prerequisites “demand undiluted, even 
heightened, attention in the settlement context.”). 
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 5. Finally, cy pres awards often create the 
appearance or reality of judicial conflicts of interest. 
New York University’s Samuel Issacharoff, Reporter 
for ALI’s Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litiga-
tion, has described cy pres relief as “an invitation to 
wild corruption of the judicial process.” Adam Liptak, 
Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
26, 2007. As the New York Times has documented, 
charities are increasingly lobbying judges for a cut of 
the proceeds in class action settlements. Id. And “[a]s 
part of their effort to secure judicial approval of 
proposed settlements, the parties often include a cy 
pres award that benefits a charity with which the 
judge or his or her family is affiliated.” Beisner at 13. 
 While greasing the wheels of justice, these tactics 
create a substantial conflict between the interests of 
the presiding judge and those of class members, who 
may be better served by direct compensation or some 
other mode of relief. See Klier, 658 F.3d at 482 (Jones, 
C.J., concurring) (“[D]istrict courts should avoid the 
legal complications that assuredly arise when judges 
award surplus settlement funds to charities and civic 
organizations.”); Bear, Stearns, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 415 
(“[W]hile courts and the parties may act with the best 
intentions, the specter of judges and outside entities 
dealing in the distribution and solicitation of large 
sums of money creates an appearance of improprie-
ty.”). Compare Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 
1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (criticizing cy pres distributions 
to alma mater), with Perkins v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 
3:05-CV-100 (CDL), 2012 WL 2839788 (M.D. Ga. July 
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10, 2012) (approving $1.5 million cy pres award to the 
presiding judge’s alma mater). Indeed, it is even 
conceivable that “parties can effectively judge-shop by 
selecting cy pres recipients that would force recusal.” 
Ted Frank, Fraley v. Facebook update, Point of Law 
(July 12, 2012) (noting district judge recusal for 
unspecified reasons after parties proposed cy pres 
settlement that named charitable beneficiaries affili-
ated with judge and her husband). 
 A more fundamental problem is that an open-
ended cy pres doctrine is incompatible with the judi-
cial role. “Federal judges are not generally equipped 
to be charitable foundations: we are not accountable 
to boards or members for funding decisions we make; 
we are not accustomed to deciding whether certain 
nonprofit entities are more ‘deserving’ of limited 
funds than others; and we do not have the institu-
tional resources and competencies to monitor that 
‘grantees’ abide by the conditions we or the settle-
ment agreements set.” In re Compact Disc Minimum 
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 236 F.R.D. 48, 53 (D. 
Me. 2006). Yet those things are exactly what federal 
judges are asked to do with increasing frequency. 
 B. Given the convenience of cy pres awards to 
defendants and class counsel, it should not be sur-
prising that their use in class action settlements is 
growing at a rapid clip. A recent paper surveying cy 
pres awards in federal court cases from 1974 through 
2008 reports the following findings: 
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First, the prevalence of class action cy pres 
awards has increased steadily by decade 
since the 1980s and has accelerated noticea-
bly after 2000. Second, since 2000, the major-
ity of class action cy pres awards are 
associated with cases that were certified 
solely for the purposes of settlement, over 
one-third of class action cy pres awards are 
associated with faux class actions, and ap-
proximately two-thirds of class action cy pres 
awards are associated with either settlement 
or faux class actions. Third, in a quarter of cy 
pres class actions, the amount and recipient 
of the cy pres award was determined ex ante, 
or prior to giving absent class members the 
opportunity to make claims on the fund. 
Fourth, the average cy pres award was $5.8 
million and accounted on average for 30.8% 
of total compensatory damages. Finally, not 
only do cy pres awards have the potential to 
increase the total available fund and legiti-
mize cases where the class might not other-
wise be certified, but they can also increase 
the likelihood and absolute amount of attor-
neys’ fees awarded without directly, or even 
indirectly, benefiting the plaintiff. 
Redish at 661. 
 The question presented by this petition is there-
fore both important and frequently recurring. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
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CONCLUSION 
 The Court should grant the petition. 
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OPINION 
 HUG, Circuit Judge: 
The question presented is whether the district court 
abused its discretion in approving the parties’ $9.5 
million settlement agreement as “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate,” either because a Facebook employee 
sits on the board of the organization distributing cy 
pres funds or because the settlement amount was too 
low. We hold that it did not. 
I 
Facebook is an online social network where members 
develop personalized web profiles to interact and 
share information with other members. The type of 
information members share varies considerably, and 
it can include news headlines, photographs, videos, 
personal stories, and activity updates. Members 
generally publish information they want to share to 
their personal profile, and the information is thereby 
broadcasted to the members’ online “friends” (i.e., 
other members in their online network). 
In November of 2007, Facebook launched a new 
program called “Beacon.” Facebook described the 
purpose of the Beacon program as allowing its 
members to share with friends information about 
what they do elsewhere on the Internet. The 
program operated by updating a member’s personal 
profile to reflect certain actions the member had 
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taken on websites belonging to companies that had 
contracted with Facebook to participate in the 
Beacon program. Thus, for example, if a member 
rented a movie through the participating website 
Blockbuster.com, Blockbuster would transmit 
information about the rental to Facebook, and 
Facebook in turn would broadcast that information 
to everyone in the member’s online network by 
publishing to his or her personal profile. 
Although Facebook initially designed the Beacon 
program to give members opportunities to prevent 
the broadcast of any private information, it never 
required members’ affirmative consent. As a result, 
many members complained that Beacon was causing 
publication of otherwise private information about 
their outside web activities to their personal profiles 
without their knowledge or approval. Facebook 
responded to these complaints (and accompanying 
negative media coverage) first by releasing a privacy 
control intended to allow its members to opt out of 
the Beacon program fully, and then ultimately by 
discontinuing operation of the program altogether. 
Unsatisfied with these responses, a group of 
nineteen plaintiffs filed a putative class action in 
federal district court against Facebook and a number 
of other entities that operated websites participating 
in the Beacon program. The class-action complaint 
alleged that the defendants had violated various 
state and federal privacy statutes.1 Each of the 
                                            
1 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986); the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986); the 
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plaintiffs’ claims centered on the general allegation 
that Beacon participants had violated Facebook 
members’ privacy rights by gathering and publicly 
disseminating information about their online 
activities without permission. The plaintiffs sought 
damages and a variety of equitable remedies for the 
alleged privacy violations. 
Facebook denied liability and filed a motion to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. Before the district 
court ruled on Facebook’s motion, the parties elected 
to attempt settling their case through private 
mediation. The parties’ initial settlement talks 
reached an impasse over whether Facebook should 
terminate the Beacon program permanently, but 
after two mediation sessions and several months of 
negotiations, Facebook and the plaintiffs arrived at a 
settlement agreement. In September of 2009, 
plaintiff Sean Lane submitted the parties’ finalized 
settlement agreement to the district court for 
preliminary approval. 
The terms of the settlement agreement provided that 
Facebook would permanently terminate the Beacon 
program and pay a total of $9.5 million in exchange 
for a release of all the plaintiffs’ class claims. Of the 
$9.5 million pay-out, approximately $3 million would 
be used to pay attorneys’ fees, administrative costs, 
and incentive payments to the class representatives. 
Facebook would use the remaining $6.5 million or so 
                                                                                                        
Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); 
California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 
1750; and California’s Computer Crime Law, Cal. Pen. Code § 
502. 
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in settlement funds to set up a new charity 
organization called the Digital Trust Foundation 
(“DTF”). The stated purpose of DTF would be to 
“fund and sponsor programs designed to educate 
users, regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical 
issues relating to protection of identity and personal 
information online through user control, and the 
protection of users from online threats.” The parties’ 
respective counsel arrived at the decision to 
distribute settlement funds through a new grant-
making organization, rather than simply give the 
funds to an existing organization, at the suggestion 
of the private mediator overseeing their 
negotiations. Neither Facebook’s nor the plaintiffs’ 
class counsel was comfortable with selecting in 
advance any particular non-profit or non-profits to 
receive the entirety of the settlement fund, so they 
acceded to the mediator’s suggestion that Facebook 
set up a new entity whose sole purpose was to 
designate fund recipients consistent with DTF’s 
mission to promote the interests of online privacy 
and security. 
According to DTF’s Articles of Incorporation, DTF 
would be run by a three-member board of directors. 
The initial three directors were Larry Magrid, a 
member of the federal government’s Online Safety 
and Technology Working Group and several other 
online safety organizations; Chris Hoofnagle, 
director of the Information Privacy Programs at the 
Berkeley Center for Law and Technology and former 
director for an office of the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center; and most relevant here, 
Timothy Sparapani, Facebook’s Director of Public 
Policy and former counsel for the American Civil 
-App. 7- 
Liberties Union. The Articles of Incorporation 
further provided that all of DTF’s funding decisions 
had to be supported by at least two members of the 
three-member board of directors but that the plan 
for succession of directors required unanimous 
approval. Finally, the Articles of Incorporation 
provided that DTF would be strictly a grant-making 
organization and could not engage in lobbying or 
litigation. 
The settlement agreement also provided for the 
creation of a Board of Legal Advisors within DTF, 
which would consist of counsel for both the plaintiff 
class and Facebook. The purpose of the Board of 
Legal Advisors would be to advise and monitor DTF 
to ensure that it acted consistently with its mission 
as articulated in the settlement agreement. 
After a hearing, the district court certified the 
plaintiff class for settlement purposes and 
preliminarily approved the parties’ proposed 
settlement. The settlement class consisted of all 
Facebook members who had visited the website of a 
Beacon participant that transmitted information 
about the members’ activity to Facebook during the 
relevant period. The district court ordered Facebook 
to identify all class members and to send the class 
notification of the settlement. Following that order, 
Facebook identified 3,663,651 class members, to 
whom it provided notice of the settlement in several 
ways. The principal method was to send an e-mail to 
the class members. Facebook also posted a notice of 
the settlement in the “Updates” section of members’ 
personal Facebook accounts and published a 
separate notice in the national edition of the 
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newspaper USA Today. All forms of notice directed 
class members to a website and toll-free number that 
contained information about the settlement. 
Also pursuant to the district court’s order, notice to 
class members informed them of their right to opt 
out of the lawsuit and settlement, and to file any 
written comments or objections with the district 
court before final approval. At the conclusion of the 
notice period, 108 class members had opted out of 
the settlement, and four had filed written objections. 
The four class members who decided to remain in 
the lawsuit but file objections to the settlement were 
Ginger McCall, Megan Marek, Benjamin Trotter, 
and Patricia Burleson (collectively  “Objectors”). 
Following a final settlement approval hearing in 
which the district court heard from both the parties 
and Objectors, the district court entered an order 
certifying the settlement class and approving the 
class settlement. The district court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ class action consistent with the settlement 
agreement, and it maintained jurisdiction over 
implementation of the settlement. The district court 
also awarded class counsel attorneys’ fees in a 
separate order. The amount of the attorneys’ fees 
was calculated at $2,322,763 under the “lodestar” 
method, meaning that the court multiplied the 
number of hours class counsel reasonably spent on 
the case by a reasonable hourly rate. That amount 
was combined with costs for a total attorneys’ fees 
award of $2,364,973, which represented less than 
one-third of the full $9.5 million settlement amount. 
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Objectors now appeal, contending that the district 
court abused its discretion in approving the parties’ 
settlement. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 
 
II 
A district court’s approval of a class-action 
settlement must be accompanied by a finding that 
the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Appellate review of the district 
court’s fairness determination is “extremely limited,” 
and we will set aside that determination only upon a 
“strong showing that the district court’s decision was 
a clear abuse of discretion.” See Hanlon v. Chrysler 
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that district court should have broad 
discretion because it “is exposed to the litigants, and 
their strategies, positions and proof”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
Both the district court and this court must evaluate 
the fairness of a settlement as a whole, rather than 
assessing its individual components. See id. at 1026. 
As our precedents have made clear, the question 
whether a settlement is fundamentally fair within 
the meaning of Rule 23(e) is different from the 
question whether the settlement is perfect in the 
estimation of the reviewing court. See id. at 1027. 
Although Rule 23 imposes strict procedural 
requirements on the approval of a class settlement, a 
district court’s only role in reviewing the substance 
-App. 10- 
of that settlement is to ensure that it is “fair, 
adequate, and free from collusion.” See id. 
A number of factors guide the district court in 
making that determination, including:  
the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, 
complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; 
the risk of maintaining class action status 
throughout the trial; the amount offered in 
settlement; the extent of discovery completed and 
the stage of the proceedings; the experience and 
views of counsel; the presence of a governmental 
participant; and the reaction of the class members to 
the proposed settlement. 
Id. at 1026 (hereinafter the “Hanlon factors”). 
Additionally, when (as here) the settlement takes 
place before formal class certification, settlement 
approval requires a “higher standard of fairness.” 
See id. The reason for more exacting review of class 
settlements reached before formal class certification 
is to ensure that class representatives and their 
counsel do not secure a disproportionate benefit “at 
the expense of the unnamed plaintiffs who class 
counsel had a duty to represent.” See id. at 1027; see 
also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel 
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 787 (3d Cir. 
1995) (explaining that “[w]ith less information about 
the class” at the early stage before formal class 
certification, the court “cannot as effectively monitor 
for collusion, individual settlements, buy-offs (where 
some individuals use the class action device to 
benefit themselves at the expense of absentees), and 
other abuses”). Accordingly, when reviewing a 
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district court’s approval of a class settlement reached 
before formal class certification, we will not affirm if 
it appears that the district court did not evaluate the 
settlement sufficiently to account for the possibility 
that class representatives and their counsel have 
sacrificed the interests of absent class members for 
their own benefit. 
The settlement in this case provides for a cy pres 
remedy. A cy pres remedy, sometimes called “fluid 
recovery,” Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 
781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004), is a settlement structure 
wherein class members receive an indirect benefit 
(usually through defendant donations to a third 
party) rather than a direct monetary payment. As 
we recently recognized, the “cy pres doctrine allows a 
court to distribute unclaimed or non-distributable 
portions of a class action settlement fund to the ‘next 
best’ class of beneficiaries.” Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 
663 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011). For purposes of 
the cy pres doctrine, a class-action settlement fund is 
“non-distributable” when “the proof of individual 
claims would be burdensome or distribution of 
damages costly.” See id. at 1038 (quoting Six 
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 
1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1990)). The district court’s 
review of a class-action settlement that calls for a cy 
pres remedy is not substantively different from that 
of any other class-action settlement except that the 
court should not find the settlement fair, adequate, 
and reasonable unless the cy pres remedy 
“account[s] for the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, 
the objectives of the underlying statutes, and the 
interests of the silent class members . . . .” Nachshin, 




Objectors challenge the district court’s conclusion 
that the settlement in this case was “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” within the meaning of 
Rule 23(e). The district court arrived at that 
determination after considering Objectors’ written 
statements and holding a fairness hearing where it 
provided Objectors an opportunity to be heard. The 
district court accompanied its fairness conclusion 
with findings of fact, which included the court’s 
application of the eight Hanlon factors to the parties’ 
settlement agreement. 
Weighing those factors, the district court found that 
the settlement should be approved on the basis of 
the following: (1) reliance on novel legal theories and 
unclear factual issues undermined the strength of 
the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the complex nature of the 
plaintiffs’ claims increased the risk and expense of 
further litigation; (3) the class action could be 
decertified at any time, which “generally weighs in 
favor of approving a settlement”; (4) “[i]n light of 
[the] litigation risks and in the context of settlement 
claims involving infringment of consumers’ privacy 
rights,” the class’s $9.5 million recovery was 
“substantial” and “directed toward a purpose closely 
related to Class Members’ interests in this 
litigation”; (5) the parties had engaged in significant 
investigation and informal discovery and research, 
which in addition to information about Beacon that 
was already publicly known enabled the plaintiff 
class to “make an informed decision with respect to 
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settlement, even though formal discovery” had not 
yet been completed; (6) the settlement was “only 
achieved after intense and protracted arm’s-length 
negotiations conducted in good faith and free from 
collusion,” and that class counsel had “reasonably 
concluded that the immediate benefits represented 
by the Settlement outweighed the possibility—
perhaps remote—of obtaining a better result at 
trial”; (7) no government agencies voiced objections 
or otherwise an-nounced actions arising out of 
Facebook’s Beacon program; and (8) only four class 
members objected and “slightly more than 100” from 
a class of over 3.6 million opted out of the 
settlement. 
Objectors raise two issues in opposition to the 
district court’s fairness findings. The first relates to 
the settlement agreement’s provision for a cy pres 
remedy. The second relates to the overall amount of 
the settlement. Objectors also raise the ancillary 
argument that notice to class members concerning 
the settlement was inadequate. We address each of 
these issues in turn. 
 
1 
Objectors’ first and strongest objection to the 
settlement goes to the structure of DTF, the 
organization that would distribute cy pres funds 
under the settlement agreement. Objectors contend 
that the presence of Tim Sparapani, Facebook’s 
Director of Public Policy, on DTF’s board of directors 
creates an unacceptable conflict of interest that will 
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prevent DTF from acting in the interests of the class. 
Citing Six Mexican Workers, Objectors claim that 
the settling parties’ decision to disburse settlement 
funds through an organization with such structural 
conflicts does not provide the “next best distribution” 
of those funds and thus is categorically an improper 
use of the cy pres remedy. 
We disagree. Objectors’ argument misunderstands 
the cy pres doctrine and the principle from our case 
law that a cy pres remedy must provide the “next 
best distribution” absent a direct monetary payment 
to absent class members. We do not require as part 
of that doctrine that settling parties select a cy pres 
recipient that the court or class members would find 
ideal. On the contrary, such an intrusion into the 
private parties’ negotiations would be improper and 
disruptive to the settlement process. See Hanlon, 
150 F.3d at 1027. The statement in Six Mexican 
Workers and elsewhere in our case law that a cy 
pres remedy must be the “next best distribution” of 
settlement funds means only that a district court 
should not approve a cy pres distribution unless it 
bears a substantial nexus to the interests of the class 
members—that, as we stated in Nachshin, the cy 
pres remedy “must account for the nature of the 
plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying 
statutes, and the interests of the silent class 
members. . . .” 663 F.3d at 1036.2 
                                            
2 Our decision in Nachshin was not published at the time of 
argument in this case, but the principles we announced there 
were well established. We discuss Nachshin here because it 
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The cy pres remedy in this case properly accounts for 
the factors outlined in Nachshin. Objectors concede 
that direct monetary payments to the class of 
remaining settlement funds would be infeasible 
given that each class member’s direct recovery would 
be de minimis. Objectors also do not dispute that 
DTF’s distribution of settlement funds to entities 
that promote the causes of online privacy and 
security will benefit absent class members and 
further the purposes of the privacy statutes that 
form the basis for the class-plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Unlike 
the cy pres remedies we disapproved in Nachshin 
and Six Mexican Workers, there is no issue in this 
case about whether the connection between the cy 
pres recipients and the absent class members is too 
tenuous, either because the cy pres entities’ missions 
are unrelated to the class’s interests or because their 
geographic scope is too limited. See Six Mexican 
Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308; Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 
1040. The cy pres remedy the settling parties here 
have devised bears a direct and substantial nexus to 
the interests of absent class members and thus 
properly provides for the “next best distribution” to 
the class. 
We find no substance in Objectors’ claim that the 
presence of a Facebook employee on DTF’s board of 
directors categorically precludes DTF from serving 
as the entity that will distribute cy pres funds. As 
the “offspring of compromise,” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 
1027, settlement agreements will necessarily reflect 
                                                                                                        
provides a helpful summary of existing case law on the cy pres 
doctrine. 
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the interests of both parties to the settlement, 
including those of the defendant. Defendants often 
insist on certain concessions in exchange for 
monetary payments or other demands plaintiffs 
make, and defendants can certainly be expected to 
structure a settlement in a way that does the least 
harm to their interests. Here, in exchange for its 
promise to pay the plaintiff class approximately $9.5 
million, Facebook insisted on preserving its role in 
the process of selecting the organizations that would 
receive a share of that substantial settlement fund 
by providing that one of its representatives would sit 
on DTF’s initial board of directors, and the plaintiffs 
readily agreed to this condition. That Facebook 
retained and will use its say in how cy pres funds 
will be distributed so as to ensure that the funds will 
not be used in a way that harms Facebook is the 
unremarkable result of the parties’ give-and-take 
negotiations,3 and the district court properly 
declined to undermine those negotiations by second-
guessing the parties’ decision as part of its fairness 
review over the settlement agreement. 
We also reject Objectors’ claim that the settlement 
agreement’s cy pres structure is impermissible 
because the parties elected to create a new grant-
making entity, DTF, rather than give cy pres funds 
                                            
3 Objectors argue that Facebook’s desire to protect its interest 
in the cy pres distribution process is tantamount to Facebook 
preserving its right to cause harm to the class. But Objectors’ 
argument assumes a false dichotomy. It is perfectly consistent 
to say that DTF can be structured both to ensure Facebook’s 
interests are not harmed and to promote the plaintiffs’ general 
interests in the causes of online privacy and security. 
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to an already-existing online privacy organization. 
Again citing Six Mexican Workers, Objectors argue 
that DTF has “no substantial record of service” and 
is therefore inherently disfavored as a cy pres 
recipient. But we have never held that cy pres funds 
must go to extant charities in order to survive 
fairness review, and a settlement agreement that 
provides for the formation of a new grant-making 
organization is not subject to a more stringent 
fairness standard. The reason we found it relevant in 
Six Mexican Workers that the charity organization 
designated to receive cy pres funds had no 
“substantial record of service” was that there was no 
way of knowing whether the organization would use 
the funds to the benefit of class members. See Six 
Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308. Here, there is 
no such worry, because the settlement agreement 
and DTF’s Articles of Incorporation tell us exactly 
how funds will be used—to “fund and sponsor 
programs designed to educate users, regulators[,] 
and enterprises regarding critical issues relating to 
protection of identity and personal information 
online through user control, and the protection of 
users from online threats.”4 As we have explained, 
that mission statement provides the requisite nexus 
between the cy pres remedy and the interests 
                                            
4 Objectors suggest that there is no assurance that DTF would 
perform in accordance with the strictures of its charter 
document, but that is unsupported speculation. There is no 
reason to suppose that both the Board of Legal Advisors 
(consisting of both the settling parties’ counsel) and the district 
court (which retained jurisdiction over implementation of the 
settlement) would abdicate their responsibility to ensure that 
DTF performs according to the settlement agreement. 
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furthered by the plaintiffs’ lawsuit consistent with 
the principles we announced in Nachshin. 
Objectors’ contention that the settling parties were 
prohibited from creating DTF to disburse cy pres 
funds is without merit, and the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in so concluding. 
 
2 
Objectors’ second argument on appeal is that the 
district court did not sufficiently evaluate the 
plaintiffs’ claims and compare the value of those 
claims with the class’s $9.5 million recovery in the 
settlement agreement. Objectors contend that the 
value of the plaintiffs’ claims was in fact greater 
than the $9.5 million the plaintiffs settled for, in 
large part because some unidentified number of the 
class members may have a claim under the Video 
Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). The VPPA 
prohibits any “video tape service provider” from 
disclosing “personally identifiable information” about 
one of its consumers, and it provides for liquidated 
damages in the amount of $2,500 for violation of its 
provisions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710(b) and 2710(c)(2). 
Objectors contend that the district court was not 
sufficiently mindful of the possibility that the class’s 
VPPA claims would yield a high recovery at trial, 
and that the court would not have approved a 
settlement of $9.5 million if it had paid the proper 
attention to that possibility. 
 As an initial matter, we reject Objectors’ argument 
insofar as it stands for the proposition that the 
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district court was required to find a specific 
monetary value corresponding to each of the plaintiff 
class’s statutory claims and compare the value of 
those claims to the proffered settlement award. 
While a district court must of course assess the 
plaintiffs’ claims in determining the strength of their 
case relative to the risks of continued litigation, see 
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026, it need not include in its 
approval order a specific finding of fact as to the 
potential recovery for each of the plaintiffs’ causes of 
action. Not only would such a requirement be 
onerous, it would often be impossible—statutory or 
liquidated damages aside, the amount of damages a 
given plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) has suffered is a 
question of fact that must be proved at trial. Even as 
to statutory damages, questions of fact pertaining to 
which class members have claims under the various 
causes of action would affect the amount of recovery 
at trial, thus making any prediction about that 
recovery speculative and contingent. 
Relatedly, the district court was not required to 
include among its findings specific commentary on 
each of the plaintiffs’ five statutory claims. All of the 
plaintiffs’ claims arise under similar privacy 
statutes, and as Facebook correctly points out, the 
plaintiffs’ likelihood of success with regard to each of 
those claims depends on the same basic legal 
theories and factual issues. The district court acted 
properly in evaluating the strength of the plaintiffs’ 
case in its entirety rather than on a claim-by-claim 
basis. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 
Moreover, the record contradicts Objectors’ general 
argument that the district court did not 
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meaningfully account for the potential value of the 
plaintiffs’ claims, including any claims under the 
VPPA. Both before and after the final settlement 
approval hearing, the district court specifically 
addressed the possibility that the presence of VPPA 
claims among some class members might affect the 
class settlement. In its order preliminarily approving 
the settlement, the district court notified the parties 
that “final approval will require a sufficient showing 
that terms of the settlement are reasonable, 
specifically in light of the claims under the VPPA,  
and the apparent availability of statutory penalties 
thereunder” (emphasis added). Following the district 
court’s instructions, the parties did address the 
VPPA issue in their briefing and arguments at the 
final approval hearing. The district court also heard 
from Objectors at that hearing, who again argued 
that the settlement was too low in light of the 
possibility of recovery under the VPPA. 
The district court rejected that argument. It first 
observed that Objectors had not “brought to the 
Court’s attention any cases in which plaintiffs have 
been awarded multiple liquidated damages,” which if 
available would likely increase the class’s potential 
recovery under the VPPA substantially (even if only 
a small number of class members had VPPA claims). 
The district court further noted that bringing the 
VPPA claims to trial would involve significant risk 
for the class given that the plaintiffs’ claims relied 
on “novel legal theories” and “vigorously disputed” 
factual issues concerning the Beacon program. And 
although the district court did not mention it in its 
approval order, the parties had presented evidence 
to the court that Blockbuster, one of the only 
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defendants that might qualify as a “video tape 
service provider” and therefore be subject to liability 
under the VPPA, was on the verge of bankruptcy, 
likely making any substantial damages against it 
annihilative. Based on its consideration of these 
factors, the district court concluded that the “$9.5 
million offered in settlement is substantial.” 
That conclusion was not an abuse of the district 
court’s broad discretion. A $9.5 million class recovery 
would be substantial under most circumstances, and 
we see nothing about this particular settlement that 
undermines the district court’s conclusion that it 
was substantial in this case. Objectors are no doubt 
correct that the VPPA claims of some class members 
might prove valuable if successful at trial, but that 
does not cast doubt on the district court’s conclusion 
as to the fairness and adequacy of the overall 
settlement amount to the class as a whole. It is an 
inherent feature of the class-action device that 
individual class members will often claim differing 
amounts of damages—that is why due process 
requires that individual members of a class certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3) be given an opportunity to opt 
out of the settlement class to pursue their claims 
separately, as were the class members in this case. 
See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1024. But a class-action 
settlement necessarily reflects the parties’ pre-trial 
assessment as to the potential recovery of the entire 
class, with all of its class members’ varying claims. 
So even if some of the class members in this case 
would have successful claims for $2,500 in statutory 
damages under the VPPA, those individuals 
represent, to use the candid phrasing of Objectors, 
“only a fraction of the 3.6 million-person class.” Their 
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presence does not in itself render the settlement 
unfair or the $9.5 million recovery among all class 
members too low.5 
Objectors rely significantly on Molski v. Gleich, 318 
F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) overruled on other 
grounds by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 
571 (9th Cir. 2010), in claiming that the cy pres 
remedy here “did not adequately protect the 
interests of the class,” but that case does not support 
Objectors’ argument. Molski involved a settlement 
that required the defendant to pay $195,000 in cy 
pres funds in exchange for a release of all the 
disability-related claims of a large class. 318 F.3d at 
943-44. The district court in Molski had certified a 
mandatory settlement class under Rule 23(b)(2) 
without providing class members an opportunity to 
opt out of the settlement. Id. at 947. In addition to 
holding that the inability to opt out of the settlement 
violated class members’ due process rights, we held 
that “use of the cy pres award was inappropriate” 
under the circumstances because the parties had not 
made any showing that direct distribution of 
                                            
5 Although a settlement is not categorically unfair for certain 
class members simply because they might recover higher 
damages than other class members were they to prosecute their 
claims individually, significant variation in claimed damages 
among class members is relevant to the Rule 23(b)(3) 
“predominance”analysis during class certification. See Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624-25, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 
138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997). However, Objectors do not challenge 
the district court’s class certification or its decision to include 
individuals with VPPA claims in the settlement class, so we 
express no opinion on that issue here. 
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settlement funds to the class would be burdensome 
or costly. Id. at 954-55. We also found “troubling” 
that the class’s recovery under the settlement was so 
low relative to the high number of potential class 
members. See id. 
Unlike the $195,000 cy pres fund in Molski, the 
settlement in this case provides for a substantial 
$9.5 million pay-out by Facebook for the benefit of 
the class and thus does not present a situation in 
which class representatives and counsel accepted 
their respective fees as a quid pro quo for quietly 
going away while the class receives virtually 
nothing. See id. at 953-54. Also fundamentally 
different is that class members here received notice 
and were given the opportunity to opt out of the 
settlement. And, most essentially, there is no dispute 
that it would be “burdensome” and inefficient to pay 
the $6.5 million in cy pres funds that remain after 
costs directly to the class because each class 
member’s recovery under a direct disbribution would 
be de minimis. See id. at 955. These features 
distinguish the present case from Molski and help to 
account for why the latter was one of the “rare” cases 
where we have intruded into the discretion of the 
district court by setting aside its determination that 
a settlement agreement is fundamentally fair. See 
Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d. 938, 960-61 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
The record here convincingly establishes that the 
district court accounted for the potential value of the 
VPPA claims of some class members, and the district 
court’s review of the circumstances surrounding the 
settlement was sufficiently comprehensive to ensure 
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that class representatives and their counsel did not 
throw absent class members under the proverbial 
bus to secure a disproportionate benefit for 
themselves. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. That 
review was accordingly compliant with this circuit’s 
requirement that the district court apply heightened 
review to a class-action settlement reached before 
formal certification. See id. at 1026. This is 
particularly manifest in that the district court’s 
detailed approval order included the specific factual 
finding that the settlement agreement “was only 
achieved after intense and protracted arm’s-length 
negotiations conducted in good faith and free from 
collusion.” Objectors have not made any showing, let 
alone a “strong” one, that this or any of the district 
court’s other findings was erroneous or amounted to 
a “clear abuse of discretion.” See id. at 1027. 
Finally, the litigants devote several pages of briefing 
to a dispute over whether the settlement 
agreement’s provision mandating the permanent  
termination of the Beacon program provided any 
meaningful relief to the plaintiff class. Specifically, 
Objectors argue that Facebook’s promise to 
terminate Beacon is “illusory” because the original 
program was non-operational at the time of the 
settlement agreement and thus already “effectively 
terminated.” In light of our holding affirming the 
district court’s conclusion that the $9.5 settlement 
award substantially furthers the interests of the 
class, Objectors’ argument that Facebook’s promise 
to terminate Beacon provides no meaningful relief is 
of little moment, and in any event we find that it is 
without merit. Even assuming Objectors’ premise 
that Beacon was already effectively terminated, 
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absent a judicially-enforceable agreement, Facebook 
would be free to revive the program whenever it 
wanted. It is thus false to say that Facebook’s 
promise never to do so was illusory. 
We affirm the district court’s holding that the 
settlement was fundamentally fair. 
 
IV 
Objectors argue additionally that the notice provided 
to class members during the opt-out period was 
insufficient because it did not describe the value of 
the plaintiffs’ statutory claims and “did not 
accurately describe what the class members would 
receive in exchange for the release” of those claims. 
Objectors argue in particular that the notice should 
have included a description of the VPPA statute, 
that it should have alerted class members that a 
Facebook employee would be on the board of the 
organization distributing cy pres funds, and that its 
reference to Facebook’s promise to terminate Beacon 
was misleading because Beacon was already 
dormant. 
We disagree. Notice provided pursuant to Rule 23(e) 
must “generally describe[ ] the terms of the 
settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with 
adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come 
forward and be heard.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g 
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted). That standard does not require 
detailed analysis of the statutes or causes of action 
forming the basis for the plaintiff class’s claims, and 
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it does not require an estimate of the potential value 
of those claims. See id. (notice need not include 
“expected value of fully litigating the case”). Nor is 
there any particular requirement that notice in a 
class-action settlement involving a cy pres remedy 
name the individuals sitting on the cy pres 
recipient’s board of directors, even if one of those 
individuals has some association with the 
defendants in the case. Finally, for the same reasons 
we reject Objectors’ argument that Facebook’s 
promise to terminate Beacon was illusory, there was 
nothing misleading about referencing that promise 
in the class notice. 
We agree with the district court that the notice in 
this case adequately apprised class members of all 
material elements of the settlement agreement and 




Ultimately, we find little in Objectors’ opposition to 
the settlement agreement beyond general 
dissatisfaction with the outcome. That 
dissatisfaction may very well be legitimate insofar as 
Objectors would have acted differently had they 
assumed the role of class representatives. But while 
Objectors may vigorously disagree with the class 
representatives’ decision not to hold out for more 
than $9.5 million or insist on a particular recipient 
of cy pres funds, that disagreement does not require 
a reviewing court to undo the settling parties’ 
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private agreement. The district court properly 
limited its substantive review of that agreement as 
necessary to determine that it was “fair, adequate, 
and free from collusion.” See id. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. This settlement perverts the 
class action into a device for depriving victims of 
remedies for wrongs, while enriching both the 
wrongdoers and the lawyers purporting to represent 
the class. 
A. The Facts.  
1. “Beacon.”  
Millions of people connect themselves to their 
“friends” on Facebook. Some Facebook “friends” are 
friends in the traditional sense, people we know and 
like. Some are more in the nature of contacts, or 
acquaintances, or people we think may want to see 
what we post. For people who regularly use 
Facebook to communicate, “friends” may merely be 
their address book. The lead plaintiff in this case, 
Sean Lane, had over 700 Facebook “friends.” 
Facebook operates like a bulletin board, so that 
“friends” can see whatever a user chooses to post and 
not make private. 
Facebook is “free,” furnished without a subscription 
price. The company makes money by selling 
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advertising. To make such sales more lucrative, 
Facebook started a program called “Beacon” in 
November 2007. Like an actual beacon, the program 
shone light to make something easier to see: in this 
case, a user’s “friends” could see whatever he had 
bought from companies that paid Facebook to 
participate in Beacon. Over forty companies signed 
up for Beacon, including Blockbuster, a movie 
retailer, Zappos, a shoe and clothing retailer, and 
Overstock.com, a discounter. If a Facebook user 
rented a movie from Blockbuster, for example, 
Facebook told all his friends what movie he had 
rented. Facebook told retailers, “Facebook Beacon 
enables your brand or business to gain access to viral 
distribution within Facebook. Stories of a user’s 
engagement with your site . . . . will act as word-of-
mouth promotion for your business and may be seen 
by friends who are also likely to be interested in your 
product.” 
Many Facebook users strongly objected to losing the 
privacy of their purchases. After all, people 
ordinarily post on their Facebook page only what 
they want to post, and they had not elected to tell all 
their “friends” what they had just bought. Some 
people buy things on the internet precisely because 
they want more privacy than they would have at a 
local store. Beacon took away their privacy, and 
broadcast their purchases to people who users 
wanted to remain in the dark. 
Worse, Facebook made it very hard for users to avoid 
these broadcasts. The user had to actively opt out. 
And opting out required video game skills. The user 
would get a pop-up on his screen asking whether he 
-App. 29- 
wanted to opt out, but the pop-up would disappear in 
about ten seconds. Too slow reading the pop-up or 
clicking the mouse, and all a user’s “friends” would 
know exactly what he had bought. Since the pop-up 
disappeared so quickly, someone looking at another 
window, or answering the phone, or just not paying 
attention, would likely not even be aware of the opt-
out option before it disappeared. 
Plaintiff Sean Lane alleges in the complaint that he 
bought a ring from Overstock.com as a surprise for 
his wife, but before he gave it to her, Facebook 
ruined the surprise by spreading the news to his 
over 700 “friends,” including many alumni in his 
college class. Ginger McCall states that her video 
rentals at Blockbuster were disclosed to all her 
“friends.” Of the vast number of people whose 
purchases were broadcast, no doubt some suffered 
embarrassment, and some suffered damage to 
employment, business, or personal relationships. 
Some Blockbuster rentals doubtless included erotica, 
some Overstock.com purchases probably included 
gifts meant to look more expensive than they were, 
and some Zappos purchases were probably more 
extravagant than purchasers’ spouses were aware. 
Someone who had told her college classmate that she 
could not attend her wedding because she could not 
afford the plane fare could lose a friend when 
Facebook told her classmate that she’d bought $400 
shoes. Mr. Lane complains that his wife asked him 
about his ring purchase before he gave it to her, 
ruining his Christmas gift to her. His wife might also 
have been less impressed by the ring than he had 
hoped, since she and all his other friends could click 
a link and see that he had bought it cheaply — good 
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for advertising Overstock.com, bad for advertising 
Mr. Lane’s generosity. 
Many users’ private purchases were exposed, and 
over 50,000 complained. Within a few weeks (long 
before this lawsuit was filed), Facebook eliminated 
the opt-out Beacon program. Facebook changed it to 
an opt-in program, so that users did not need to 
maintain video game alertness to avoid disclosure to 
all their friends. In the opt-in version of Beacon, 
purchases made in private stayed private unless the 
user expressly allowed Facebook to publicize them.  
One of the objectors to the settlement, Ginger 
McCall, says her movie rentals were disclosed even 
after Beacon had supposedly changed to an opt-in, 
and no findings have been made on whether the opt-
in worked or was tricky to operate. 
2. The Settlement.  
This lawsuit was filed in August 2008, about eight 
months after the opt-out version of Beacon had 
ended. The complaint challenged only the opt-out 
program that had lasted for a few weeks, not the opt-
in version that had been in place since then. The 
parties mediated and settled, all before any class 
was certified. They agreed to end Beacon, both opt-in 
as it then was, and opt-out as it had been originally. 
The settlement agreement approved by the district 
court (mistakenly, in my view) greatly changed the 
class aspect of the case. First, the parties agreed to 
certify the class for purposes of settlement. Second, 
they agreed to expand it far beyond what the 
complaint had sought. The complaint sought 
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damages only for users affected during the few 
weeks when they had to opt out, but the settlement 
expanded the class to include everyone affected 
during the much longer opt-in period. Since the 
members of the class got no money from the 
settlement, the effect of certification and expansion 
was to bar any claims the expanded class might 
have, not to provide more people with recompense. 
In exchange for nothing, class members were barred 
from suing Facebook, Blockbuster, Overstock.com, or 
any of the other defendants for any claims arising 
from or relating to Beacon, “including, without 
limitation, arising from or related to data gathered 
from Beacon.” 
The majority states that Facebook promised never to 
revive the Beacon program, but this is not quite 
right. Facebook remained free to revive the program, 
even the cancelled version under which the 
subscriber had only a few seconds to opt out. The 
only limitation the settlement imposed was that 
Facebook had to call the Beacon program by some 
other name. The agreement said that Facebook 
would terminate “the Beacon Program,” and defined 
“Beacon” to mean “the program launched by 
Facebook on November 6, 2007 and all iterations 
thereof bearing the ‘Beacon’ name” (emphasis 
added). The district judge asked about this term, and 
plaintiffs’ attorney expressly conceded that Facebook 
was free to reinstitute the same program under a 
different name. “[T]he problem was when you tried 
to describe the functionality and you preclude 
Facebook from using that functionality going 
forward, it becomes truly problematic and becomes 
impossible to reach an agreement because you’re 
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limiting their ability to run their business. . . . At the 
end of the day, we could not reach agreement with 
defendants regarding limiting their future actions as 
a corporation.” That was an on the record concession 
that the injunction meant as little as it said, and 
Facebook remained free to do what it had done 
before, under a different name. The injunctive relief 
the class received was no relief at all, not even a 
restriction on future identical conduct. 
Facebook users who had suffered damages from past 
exposure of their purchases got no money, not a 
nickel, from the defendants. Even those who had 
rented videos, and were arguably entitled to 
statutory damages of $2,500 for each disclosure, got 
nothing.1 Class counsel, on the other had, got 
millions. Plaintiffs’ lawyers and Facebook agreed 
that Facebook would not object to attorneys’ fees up 
to one third of what they called the “settlement 
fund.” One third would be a fee of $3,166,667. The 
fee would come out of the “settlement fund” and 
would not be in addition to it, so Facebook had no 
economic interest in reducing the amount. The fee 
                                            
1 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1), (c)(1)-(2) (“A video tape service 
provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally 
identifiable information concerning any consumer of such 
provider shall be liable . . . . Any person aggrieved by any act of 
a person in violation of this section may bring a civil action in a 
United States district court. The court may award -- (A) actual 
damages but not less than liquidated damage in an amount of 
$2500; (B) punitive damages; (C) reasonable attorneys’ fees and 
other litigation costs reasonably incurred; and (D) such other 
preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be 
appropriate.”). 
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actually approved by the district court was 
$2,322,763 plus costs of $42,210.58, 25% of the 
“settlement fund.” That $2.3 million payment was 
for getting their clients nothing and barring all the 
claims of a vastly broadened class. 
Not a cent of the remaining “settlement fund” money 
would go to the Facebook users on whose behalf class 
counsel purportedly settled. The only exceptions 
were $10,000 to Mr. Lane, $5,000 each to two others, 
and $1,000 each to the other 19 named plaintiffs, 
amounting to $39,000 for the few people in the class 
who presumably had personally agreed to have class 
counsel represent them. 
The remaining millions were to go to a new “privacy 
foundation” that did not yet exist. The board of the 
new foundation would be three directors to be agreed 
upon by Facebook and class counsel, or if they 
disagreed one chosen by each and the third chosen 
by those two. Under the agreement, all three 
directors could come from the Facebook advertising 
and sales staff if class counsel and Facebook so 
chose. The board of directors of this “privacy 
foundation” was to be advised by Facebook’s own 
lawyer and class counsel. The agreement provided 
that the “privacy foundation” was to use its millions 
to “fund projects and initiatives that promote the 
cause of online privacy, safety, and security” 
however its Facebook-friendly board chose. 
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B. Analysis.  
The class action rule2 was designed to facilitate 
lawsuits where individuals’ or small groups’ 
judgments would not add up to enough money to 
justify hiring lawyers, but judgments for large 
numbers of similarly situated victims of misconduct 
would. “The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or 
her rights. A class action solves this problem by 
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries 
into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor.”3 
This procedural device has obvious attendant risks, 
because class counsel’s “clients” are not clients at all 
in the traditional sense; they do not hire the lawyer, 
they do not agree on a fee with him, and they do not 
control whether he settles their case. They are in no 
position to prevent class counsel from pursuing his 
own interests at their expense.4 The named 
plaintiffs, those who actually have some chance of 
directing their lawyers, typically get amounts of cash 
without much relation to their individual damages, 
                                            
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
3 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S. 
Ct. 2231, 138 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
4 See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959-60 (9th Cir. 
2003). 
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so their incentives align more with class counsel 
than with their fellow class members. 
Defendant and class counsel, in any class action, 
have incentives to collude in an agreement to bar 
victims’ claims for little or no compensation to the 
victims, in exchange for a big enough attorneys’ fee 
to induce betrayal of the interests of the purported 
“clients.” The defendant’s agreement not to oppose 
some amount for the fee creates the same incentive 
as a payment to a prizefighter to throw a fight. A 
real client may refuse a settlement that is bad for 
him but benefits his lawyer, but a large class of 
unknown individuals lacks the knowledge or 
authority to say no. It is hard to imagine a real client 
saying to his lawyer, “I have no objection to the 
defendant paying you a lot of money in exchange for 
agreement to seek nothing for me.” “The absence of 
individual clients controlling the litigation for their 
own benefit creates opportunities for collusive 
arrangements in which defendants can pay the 
attorneys for the plaintiff class enough money to 
induce them to settle the class action for too little 
benefit to the class (or too much benefit to the 
attorneys, if the claim is weak but the risks to the 
defendants high).”5 
Rule 23 protects against these risks much as the 
courts have traditionally protected against similar 
risks when attorneys represent children, estates of 
deceased persons, and unknown persons, by 
                                            
5 Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1327 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
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requiring judicial approval of settlements. Approval 
and review, though, are a weak substitute for real 
clients, because judges know little about the case 
beyond what the lawyers tell them. That works 
much better when the lawyers are on different sides 
than when they are on the same side. Judges also 
may face an incentive problem, where a heavy 
docket cannot easily withstand the additional weight 
of a huge lawsuit that does not settle. Objectors 
provide a critically valuable service of providing 
knowledge from a different point of view, but one 
that is too often not used effectively. Our review 
process is supposed to assure that settlement of a 
class action, despite the risk of perverse incentives, 
is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”6 and that notice is 
given “in a reasonable manner”7 so that those bound 
by the settlement have an opportunity to be heard. 
In this case, the process has failed. The attorneys for 
the class have obtained a judgment for millions of 
dollars in fees. The defendant, Facebook, has 
obtained a judgment that bars claims by millions of 
people victimized by its conduct. So have the other 
companies involved in Beacon. The victims, on the 
other hand, have obtained nothing. Under the 
settlement, Facebook even preserved the right to do 
the same thing to them again. 
 
                                            
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). 
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1. The Settlement is Unfair, Unreasonable, and 
Inadequate.  
The factors for evaluating class action settlements8 
are multifarious and indeterminate, but the cases 
have become less tolerant of settlements not 
beneficial to class members. We used to be extremely 
deferential when district courts approved 
settlements, as in Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.,9 the 
1998 case on which the majority relies. We have in 
the last few years become much less so, as in our 
recent decisions In re Bluetooth,10 Nachshin v. AOL, 
LLC,11 and Dennis v. Kellogg Co.12 We still exercise 
                                            
8 See, e.g., Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th 
Cir. 1998) (“Assessing a settlement proposal requires the 
district court to balance a number of factors: the strength of the 
plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 
duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class 
action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in 
settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of 
the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the 
presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the 
class members to the proposed settlement.”) (citation omitted); 
Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688 
F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that such factors are “by 
no means an exhaustive list of relevant considerations . . . . The 
relative degree of importance to be attached to any particular 
factor will depend upon and be dictated by the nature of the 
claim(s) advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique 
facts and circum-stances presented by each individual case.”). 
9 Hanlon, 150 F.3d 1011. 
10 In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 
946 (9th Cir. 2011). 
11 Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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deferential review for abuse of discretion, but do so 
in light of what we rejected in Bluetooth, Nachshin, 
and Dennis. Review for abuse of discretion has never 
meant that we will affirm whatever a district court 
does.13 
An extremely important qualification even in Hanlon 
was a “higher standard of fairness”14 when 
settlement is reached before a class is certified. In 
this case, not only was settlement reached before 
class certification, but the class certified for 
settlement purposes was far broader than the one 
sought when the case was filed. The Hanlon “higher 
standard of fairness” matters because of “the 
dangers of collusion between class counsel and the 
defendant.”15 Bluetooth emphasizes the need for 
greater scrutiny of precertification settlement on 
behalf of a class.16 “Collusion may not always be 
evident on the face of a settlement, and courts 
therefore must be particularly vigilant not only for 
                                                                                                        
12 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
13 Cf. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 
1301, 1307-09 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district court’s use 
of cy pres to distribute unclaimed settlement funds was an 
abuse of discretion because it did not “adequately target the 
plaintiff class and fail[ed] to provide adequate supervision over 
distribution”). 
14 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026; see also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 
937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Dukes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010). 
15 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 
16 In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d 935, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs that 
class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-
interests and that of certain class members to infect 
the negotiations.”17 
Collusion is far more likely before certification, and 
exponentially higher if the class is expanded as part 
of the settlement. Here is why. If a lawsuit is only on 
behalf of named plaintiffs, damages are limited to 
what they may properly receive, so if a case is 
reasonably defensible, a defendant may make a 
sound financial decision to defend. But if a vast class 
is certified, then even a meritless case may require a 
defendant to settle or bet all the money it has or can 
borrow for attorneys’ fees, because even a very small 
chance of a very large verdict is too much to risk. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel want certification, to make the 
damages enough to be worth the time and expense of 
the litigation. Defense counsel oppose it, to keep the 
risk down to a level where they can afford the risk of 
litigation. Because certification of a class may turn 
even a meritless plaintiff’s case into a bet-the-
company defendant’s case, defendants usually 
vigorously oppose class certification, giving courts 
the benefit of adversarial presentations. 
Once the parties agree to settle, and agree to certify 
a class, defendant’s interests are reversed. Plaintiffs’ 
counsel still have an interest in keeping a large class 
certified, because the larger the class, the higher the 
attorneys’ fees are likely to be. But if the defendant 
will get a bar against claims, almost always a term 
                                            
17 Id. at 947. 
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of any settlement, the more people whose claims are 
barred the better. The risk of having to pay out a 
huge amount of money gets converted, by class 
certification, into a certainty that vast numbers of 
people will be unable to sue the defendant. So when 
settling before class certification, and agreeing upon 
class certification as part of the settlement, both 
sides have the same incentive, to certify the class 
and make it as vast and all-encompassing as 
possible. It is a bonanza for the defendant if it can 
bar the claims not only of everyone in the class 
described in the complaint, but also of a much larger 
class on whose behalf more and different claims 
might have been asserted. 
And that is just what happened here. The complaint 
claims wrongdoing against and damages to Facebook 
users during the few weeks of the opt-out period of 
“Beacon.” The settlement bars claims of all the users 
during that period and during the much longer opt-
in period. When they settled, Facebook and class 
counsel shared the same interest, as broad a class 
certification as possible. Ideally, from both the point 
of view of both sides’ interests (attorneys’ fees for one 
side, protection from claims for the other) the class 
would include everyone in the world, and bar all 
claims of any kind from the beginning of time to the 
present day. They came about as close to that as 
they plausibly could. 
Bluetooth emphasizes that “clear sailing” 
agreements on attorneys’ fees are important warning 
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signs of collusion.18 We have a version of a clear 
sailing agreement here: Facebook’s agreement not to 
oppose an attorneys’ fees claim of up to $3,166,667. 
If, as here, the defendant agrees not to oppose an 
attorneys’ fees claim, and defendants payout will be 
the same no matter how high the fee is, then both 
sides have an incentive to make the fee large enough 
to induce plaintiffs’ counsel to sacrifice class 
interests to plaintiffs’ attorneys’ interests. Bluetooth 
holds that caution is especially necessary when, as 
here, members of the class receive no money, but 
class counsel receive a great deal of it.19 As the 
amount of the fee to which no objection will be made 
grows, especially if the fee will not affect the cost to 
the defendant, it makes economic sense (though not 
ethical sense) for plaintiffs’ counsel to throw the 
fight for the money. 
Strikingly, the settlement here goes even further 
than coupon settlements, where class members get 
only discounts if they buy again from the defendant 
claimed to have wronged them before, while their 
purported lawyers get huge amounts of money. Here 
the Facebook users get nothing at all, not even 
coupons. Every nickel of the remainder of the 
$9,500,000 after class counsel’s cut, administrative 
                                            
18 In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947 (“[A] ‘clear sailing’ 
arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees 
separate and apart from class funds . . . carries the potential of 
enabling a defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and 
costs in exchange for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on 
behalf of the class.”) (citation and quotation omitted). 
19 Id. at 947. 
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costs, and incentive payments to the named 
plaintiffs, goes not to the victims, but to an entity 
partially controlled by Facebook and class counsel. 
The new entity, dressed to look good in old law 
French with its “cy pres” award and “non-profit” 
status, can spend the money to “educate” people 
about privacy on the internet, perhaps via some 
instructional videos on how to use all the privacy 
features available in Facebook. 
Arguably, no harm would be done if all claims of 
wrong-doing to Facebook users from the Beacon pro-
gram were frivolous. If their claims were worthless, 
then no wrong is done to them when those claims are 
barred and $9.5 million gets transferred to some 
lawyers they never met and a new entity not likely 
to benefit them. But that would denigrate the claims 
too far. There is reason to believe that Facebook 
needed the shield its $9.5 million bought. Facebook 
got customer complaints and bad publicity from the 
opt-out Beacon program. The class had colorable 
claims. Facebook had a good argument that it was 
not itself a “video tape service provider” under the 
federal statute entitling a customer to liquidated 
damages of $2,500 for disclosure of what videotape 
someone had rented from Blockbuster,20 but still had 
a risk of some sort of vicarious, joint, or “civil 
conspiracy” liability.21 If found liable, it was a deep 
                                            
20 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4), (c)(2). 
21 In their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that Facebook was 
engaged in a civil conspiracy to violate the Video Privacy 
Protection Act. See Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia 
Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 869 P.2d 454, 457 
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pocket target for the punitive damages for which the 
statute expressly provides.22 And at least one federal 
district court has taken an expansive view of who is 
a “video tape service provider” prohibited from 
making disclosures.23 The facts alleged in the 
complaint stimulate a concern about the privacy of 
people’s purchases on the internet and the use of 
customer information by Facebook. 
Tort law tends to evolve to make actionable conduct 
widely seen as harmful, especially when the conduct 
is willful, as it was here. The plaintiffs’ claims and 
the risk of that evolution of tort law were worth 
money to avoid, for Facebook. We cannot reasonably 
say that a risk worth $9.5 million to Facebook to 
avoid nevertheless had no value whatsoever to the 
potential claimants whose claims presented that 
risk. If Facebook users had no colorable claims, why 
would Facebook have paid $9.5 million to bar them? 
2. The Settlement does not Meet our Standards for 
Cy Pres Awards.  
Even if the $9.5 million number, the attorneys’ fees, 
and the absence of any relief whatsoever to class 
members all were “fair, reasonable and adequate,” 
the new foundation would still not satisfy the 
standards for cy pres awards. We held in Dennis v. 
                                                                                                        
(Cal. 1994) (giving an overview of the California law of civil 
conspiracy). 
22 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2)(B). 
23 Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1167 (W.D. 
Wash., 2010). 
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Kellogg Co.24 quoting Staton v. Boeing Co.,25 that cy 
pres distributions present “a particular danger” that 
“incentives favoring pursuit of self-interest rather 
than the class’s interests in fact influenced the 
outcome of negotiations.”26 
Cy pres traditionally was a means by which, say, a 
bequest to a charity no longer existing when a 
testator died might be given instead to a similar 
charity doing similar work. Thus a bequest to the 
Boys’ Club might go to its replacement, the Boys’ 
and Girls’ Club. The doctrine has never meant 
simply that money for harm to someone would be 
given to someone else preferred by the defendant 
and plaintiff’s attorney and perhaps by the court. We 
cautioned in Nachshin v. AOL that “When selection 
of cy pres beneficiaries is not tethered to the nature 
of the lawsuit and the interests of the silent class 
members, the selection process may answer to the 
whims and self interests of the parties, their counsel, 
or the court.”27 
The rules of judicial ethics have in many forms for 
over a hundred years prohibited judges from 
endorsing charities, because of the risk that lawyers 
and litigants will feel compelled to contribute to 
                                            
24 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
25 Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003). 
26 Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 687 F.3d 1149, 2012 WL 2870128, at 
*6. 
27 Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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them.28 Too liberal an approach to cy pres means 
that a court may simply order, and not merely 
encourage, someone subject to its jurisdiction to give 
to a preferred charity. A defendant may prefer a cy 
pres award to a damages award, for the public 
relations benefit. And the larger the cy pres award, 
the easier it is to justify a larger attorneys’ fees 
award. The incentive for collusion may be even 
greater where, as here, there is nothing to stop 
Facebook and class counsel from managing the 
charity to serve their interests and pay salaries and 
consulting fees to persons they choose. 
Nachshin holds that the district court must ensure 
that a cy pres award targets the plaintiff class.29 
Here it does not. Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona 
Citrus Growers30 holds that a district court must 
reject awards that provide “no reasonable certainty 
that any member will be benefitted.”31 This one does 
                                            
28 Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, first adopted by 
the ABA in 1924, states that a judge “should not solicit for 
charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which . 
. . might bring his personal interest into conflict with the 
impartial performance of his official duties.”Henry S. Drinker, 
Legal Ethics 274, 333 (1965). The current ABA Model Rules 
have similar language. Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 3.7 
(2007). Something akin to this was an issue in Nachshin, where 
the judge’s husband sat on the board of a legal aid foundation 
that was to receive a donation as part of the settlement. 
Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1041. 
29 Nachshin, 663 F.3d at 1039-40. 
30 Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 
1301(9th Cir. 1990). 
31 Id. at 1308. 
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not. We require an established record of performance 
by the charity of acts beneficial to people in the 
wronged class.32 The cy pres award in this case goes 
to a new entity with no past performance at all. For 
all we know it will fund nothing but an “educational 
program” amounting to an advertising campaign for 
Facebook. That would appear to satisfy the articles 
and bylaws, and Facebook, after all, together with 
class counsel and their nominees, will run it. 
3. Notice.  
We review adequacy of notice de novo, not 
deferentially.33 This is because notice is a matter of 
due process of law.34 If a person owns a claim, it is 
property, and the owner of the claim is 
constitutionally entitled not to have it taken from 
him except with reasonable notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. Notice in this case was 
inadequate, most obviously because the class was 
not sufficiently informed that Facebook itself might 
be in control of the money purportedly awarded on 
account of wrongs it committed against class 
members. The articles of incorporation and bylaws of 
the purportedly charitable foundation were posted 
online for the class to see only a week before the 
deadline to opt out of the settlement. Those 
documents said that “Tim Sparapani” would be on 
                                            
32 Id. 
33 Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1994). 
34 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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the three-person board, but failed to mention who he 
was, Facebook’s own Director of Public Policy. Nor 
did the notice say that Facebook’s counsel, Michael 
Rhodes, would sit on the foundation’s legal advisory 
board. Class members would have had to look 
carefully at the settlement agreement and figure out 
that Mr. Rhodes, the man designated as a legal 
advisor on page twelve of the settlement agreement, 
was the same man listed as Facebook’s attorney on 
page five. Class members dependant on the notice 
would have no idea that the money supposedly paid 
for wrongs to them was to be spent by agents of the 
purported wrongdoer. 
Conclusion 
The majority approves ratification of a class action 
settlement in which class members get no 
compensation at all. They do not get one cent. They 
do not get even an injunction against Facebook doing 
exactly the same thing to them again. Their 
purported lawyers get millions of dollars. Facebook 
gets a bar against any claims any of them might 
make for breach of their privacy rights. The most we 
could say for the cy pres award is that in exchange 
for giving up any claims they may have, the exposed 
Facebook users get the satisfaction of contributing to 
a charity to be funded by Facebook, partially 
controlled by Facebook, and advised by a legal team 
consisting of Facebook’s counsel and their own 
purported counsel whom they did not hire and have 
never met. 
Facebook deprived its users of their privacy. And 
now they are deprived of a remedy.  
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., 
et al., Defendants. 
No. C 08-3845 RS 
March 17, 2010, Decided 
March 17, 2010, Filed 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT 
A hearing was held before this Court on February 
26, 2010, pursuant to the Court’s Preliminary 
Approval Order of October 23, 2009, upon a 
Settlement Agreement, dated as of September 17, 
2009 (the “Settlement Agreement”) in the above-
captioned Litigation. Due notice of the hearing was 
given in accordance with the Preliminary Approval 
Order which was adequate and sufficient and in 
accordance with the Court’s Preliminary Approval 
Order. The represented parties appeared by their 
attorneys of record, and an opportunity to be heard 
was given to all other persons desiring to be heard as 
provided in the notice. The Court has considered the 
terms of the proposed Settlement as set forth in the 
Settlement Agreement, and the submissions and 
arguments with respect to it. Accordingly, the Court 
makes following findings and orders thereon: 
A. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the Litigation pursuant to Title 28, United 
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States Code, section 1332, and all acts within the 
Litigation, and over all the parties to the Litigation, 
and all members of the Settlement Class. 
B. This Order incorporates herein and makes a part 
hereof the Settlement Agreement, including the 
Exhibits thereto. Unless otherwise provided herein, 
the terms defined in the Settlement Agreement shall 
have the same meanings for purposes of this Order. 
C. Notice to the Settlement Class and other 
potentially interested parties has been provided in 
accordance with the notice requirements specified by 
the Court in the Preliminary Approval Order. 
Additionally, subsequent to preliminary approval, 
the parties proposed amending the notice 
requirements to specify that Class members would 
be given notice by email to the Class members’ email 
addresses on file with Facebook, in lieu of an 
internal Facebook message in the ‘Updates’ Section.” 
The Court declined to execute the parties’ 
stipulation, instead inquiring if it would be more 
appropriate to utilize email notice in addition to that 
specified in the Preliminary Approval Order, rather 
than in lieu of it. Although the Preliminary Approval 
Order was never expressly amended to require it, 
notice was thereafter given by email in addition to 
the other forms of notice. Such notice fully and 
accurately informed the Settlement Class Members 
of all material elements of the proposed Settlement 
and of their opportunity to object to, comment 
thereon, or exclude themselves from, the Settlement. 
It provided Settlement Class Members adequate 
instructions and a variety of means to obtain 
additional information and represented the best 
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notice practicable under the circumstances. The 
notice was valid, due, and sufficient to all Settlement 
Class Members and complied fully with the laws of 
the of State of California, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the United States Constitution, due 
process and other applicable laws. Notice was given 
in a timely manner pursuant to the Order of this 
Court on Preliminary Approval and provided 
adequate time for Class Members to comment and 
object. Further, this Court finds that adequate notice 
was provided as required under the Class Action 
Fairness Act.  
D. One individual objector submitted an objection 
complaining that the email notice he was given was 
intercepted by his email program’s “spam filter.” The 
objector asserted that this occurred despite the fact 
that he has received other email from Facebook that 
was not filtered. Although it is not entirely clear how 
or why this may have occurred, the Court is satisfied 
that the possibility that some Class members have 
activated settings on their email accounts that might 
filter the email notices does not undermine the 
overall adequacy of the notice given. Indeed, even 
the objector appears to have received actual notice 
via email, albeit only because he checked the 
contents of his spam filter, which not all Class 
members may have done. 
E. A full opportunity was afforded to the Settlement 
Class Members to participate in, comment on, opt-
out and/or object to the Settlement, notice and 
claims procedure. A list of those members of the 
Settlement Class who timely opted-out of the 
Settlement and the Settlement Class and who 
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therefore are not bound by the Settlement, the 
provisions of the Settlement Agreement, this Order 
and the Judgment to be entered by Clerk of Court, 
hereon, has been submitted by the Claims 
Administrator and is attached hereto as Exhibit A 
and incorporated by reference herein. All other 
members of the Settlement Class (as permanently 
certified below) shall be subject to all of the 
provisions of this Order. 
F. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) lists four 
conjunctive criteria that must be met to certify a 
class action: numerosity, commonality of issues, 
typicality of the representative plaintiffs’ claims, and 
adequacy of representation. A class may only be 
certified if the court is “satisfied, after a rigorous 
analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have 
been satisfied.” General Telephone Co. of Southwest 
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 
L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). Based on the record before the 
Court, including all submissions in support of the 
Settlement Agreement, objections, comments and 
responses thereto, as well as the settlement set forth 
in the Settlement Agreement, this Court finds that 
the applicable requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 have been satisfied with respect to the 
Settlement Class and the proposed Settlement. 
Specifically, this Court finds that, with regard to the 
proposed Settlement Class, Rule 23(a) is satisfied in 
that: 
1. The Settlement Class, as defined below, is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable. The undisputed record indicates that 
there are over 3.6 million members of the class. 
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2. There are questions of law and fact common to 
members of the Settlement Class in that all the 
allegations and claims in this matter arise from the 
operation of Facebook’s Beacon program on third-
party sites and its transmission of personal 
information to Facebook. 
3. The representative Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of 
the claims of members of the Settlement Class. 
Collectively, the representative Plaintiffs’ claims 
implicate each of the defendants. More importantly, 
all of the named Plaintiffs’ and Settlement Class 
Members’ claims arise from the operation of the 
Beacon program—a common course of conduct 
resulting in the same or similar alleged injuries. See 
In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) 
Antitrust Litig., 264 F.R.D. 603, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110407, 2009 WL 4263524 *4 (N.D. Cal.) 
(quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 
508 (9th Cir. 1992). Although some claims of some 
Settlement Class Members arise from statutes 
unique to the third-party Beacon Merchants with 
whom they interacted, the more salient 
characteristic of the Class is the Beacon nexus and 
the statutory claims, such as the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), common to all 
Class Members. These reasonably coextensive claims 
support typicality more than any disparities in 
particular statutory damages militate against it. See 
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(“[t]he amount of damages is invariably an 
individual question and does not defeat class action 
treatment”); see also In re SRAM Antitrust Litig., 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110407, 2009 WL 4263524 *4 
(citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 
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1020 (9th Cir. 1998); (compare Video Privacy 
Protection Act, Title 18, United States Code, section 
2710(c)(2)(A) (liquidated damages of $ 2,500) and the 
ECPA Wiretap Act, Title 18, United States Code, 
section 2520(c)(2)(B) (statutory damages of 
whichever is the greater of $ 100 a day for each day 
of violation or $ 10,000)). 
4. Settlement Class Counsel and class 
representatives have fairly and adequately protected 
the interests of the Settlement Class. By Order 
dated October 23, 2009, this Court, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g), appointed 
Scott A. Kamber and David A. Stampley of 
KamberLaw, LLC and Joseph H. Malley of the Law 
Office of Joseph H. Malley, P.C., as Class Counsel for 
the Settlement Class, providing the Settlement 
Class with representation by nationally recognized 
members of the class action bar and significant 
experience in consumer privacy and technology 
matters. Counsel’s efforts on behalf of the Class to 
reach a settlement included protracted arms-length 
negotiations for over a year as well as opposition to a 
motion to intervene. The attorneys of KamberLaw 
have made a showing that they possess experience 
and expertise in the areas of consumer privacy and 
technology matters and have professionally 
represented the interests of the Class in this matter. 
G. Because certification is for settlement purposes 
only and not for litigation purposes, the Court need 
not consider whether the case, if tried, would present 
intractable manageability problems. Nonetheless, 
the Court finds that on the record presented that 
there would not be intractable manageability 
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problems and, in fact, the class would be manageable 
given its unitary nature and the high likelihood of 
success in identifying Class Members. 
With regard to the proposed Settlement Class, Rule 
23(b)(3) is satisfied in that issues of law and fact 
common to the Class predominate over those 
affecting individual Class Members and that a class 
action is the superior method to adjudicate these 
claims. 
H. The Court has held a hearing to consider the 
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of 
Settlement, has been advised of all objections to and 
comments regarding the Settlement, and has given 
fair consideration to such objections and comments. 
The Court has reviewed the papers submitted by the 
parties and by all persons objecting to and 
commenting on the Settlement and has heard the 
arguments of those objectors to the Settlement 
appearing at the fairness hearing. 
I. The Settlement, as provided for in the Settlement 
Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate and proper 
and in the best interests of the Settlement Class. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered 
the record in its entirety, all objections and 
comments submitted to the Court, and the 
arguments of counsel for the parties and all other 
persons seeking to comment on the proposed 
Settlement.  
The Court has considered a number of factors in its 
evaluation of the Settlement, including: (1) the 
strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, 
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complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; 
(3) the risk of maintaining class action status 
throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in 
settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and 
the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and 
views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental 
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class 
members to the proposed settlement. Molski v. 
Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953 (9th Cir. 2003); Hanlon v. 
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 
1. Regarding the strength of plaintiff’s case, 
plaintiffs’ claims implicate factual issues that would 
likely be vigorously disputed, such as the type and 
sufficiency of notice Class Members received about 
Beacon activity during specific time periods, the 
nature of Class Members’ agreements with Facebook 
and the extent to which Beacon’s transfer and 
distribution of personal information was legally 
unauthorized. 
In addition, Plaintiffs’ claims raise novel legal 
theories with little in the way of prior decisions to 
assist in gauging the likelihood of success. For 
example, regarding Blockbuster’s liability under the 
VPPA, neither the parties nor objectors have 
brought to the Court’s attention any cases in which 
plaintiffs have been awarded multiple liquidated 
damages. Facebook also has denied it is liable under 
the VPPA definition of “video tape service provider.” 
2. The contested facts and novelty of claims increase 
the likelihood of risk, expense, complexity and 
protracted duration of further litigation, which 
would be significant even without such factors. 
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Despite the brevity of the period of Beacon operation 
at issue, the parties would have had to conduct 
costly discovery of voluminous, not-easily-readable 
Internet transaction logs of highly-trafficked 
websites operated by numerous Defendants as well 
as defendant Facebook’s software code for its Beacon 
functions, and to engage in extensive preparations 
for trial. This would have required significant time 
and expense in reviewing discovery materials with 
the assistance of experts and in preparing expert 
witness reports and expert witnesses for deposition 
and trial. Further, taking into consideration the 
number of defendants involved, bringing this case to 
trial would likely have been a long and costly 
proposition, the outcome of which would have been 
uncertain. This factor supports the fairness, 
reasonableness and adequacy of the Settlement. 
3. The risk that a class action may be decertified at 
any time generally weighs in favor of approving a 
settlement. Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp., 563 
F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, although there 
has been no specific showing that maintaining class 
action status throughout trial would be particularly 
difficult or problematic, the general risks and 
burdens on plaintiffs in doing so further support the 
propriety of the settlement. 
4. In light of these litigation risks and in the context 
of settlements involving claims of infringement of 
consumers’ privacy rights, the $ 9.5 million offered 
in settlement is substantial and, further, is directed 
toward a purpose closely related to Class Members’ 
interests in this litigation. The objectors do not 
suggest otherwise, except to state that the “safety” 
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element of the Privacy Foundation charter is 
unrelated to the Class Members’ claims. However, 
given the nexus of online privacy, safety and 
security, particularly as those values relate to the 
online threat landscape and the benefit of protecting 
consumers’ identities and personal information 
online from those threats, the Privacy Foundation as 
constituted is sufficiently related to the claims raised 
by Class Members. 
5. The court has also considered the extent of 
discovery completed and the stage of the 
proceedings. The parties have engaged in significant 
investigation, informal discovery and research, and 
have documented these efforts to the court, both at 
the Final Approval hearing as well as in the 
declaration of Scott A. Kamber, Dkt. 107. These 
efforts supplement the substantial information about 
Beacon that is already publicly known, including 
how it operates technically, the nature and timing of 
modifications to its data collection, and how 
Facebook interacted with the Facebook Beacon-
Activated Affiliates. Such information places the 
Plaintiff Class in a position to make an informed 
decision about settlement. Class Counsel established 
that they acquired sufficient information to make an 
informed decision with respect to settlement, even 
though formal discovery is not complete. See In re 
Mego Financial Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
6. The next factor the Court has considered is the 
experience and views of counsel. The Court 
recognizes that the Settlement was only achieved 
after intense and protracted arm’s-length 
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negotiations conducted in good faith and free from 
collusion, through the efforts of counsel with 
recognized experience in complex litigation involving 
technology and privacy issues such as those 
presented in this case. Class Counsel demonstrated 
an understanding of both the strengths and 
weaknesses of this case. See declaration of Class 
Counsel Scott A. Kamber, Dkt. 107. Based on the 
facts of the case and Class Counsel’s experience in 
these types of cases, Class Counsels’ reasonably 
concluded that the immediate benefits represented 
by the Settlement outweighed the possibility—
perhaps remote—of obtaining a better result at trial, 
especially given the hurdles inherent in proving 
liability on behalf of the Settlement Class and the 
additional expense and delay inherent in any trial 
and likely subsequent appeals. This factor supports 
the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the 
Settlement. 
7. Notice of the preliminary approval of this class 
action was provided pursuant to the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005. In addition, Class Counsel 
explained at the Final Approval hearing that they 
were contacted by, and spoke with, representatives 
of the attorneys general of four states and responded 
to their questions regarding the Settlement. No 
government agencies voiced objections or comments 
to the Court. In addition, the Settlement stands as 
the product of the efforts of Class Counsel, inasmuch 
as no attorneys general or federal regulatory 
personnel have announced actions regarding the 
Facebook Beacon issues present in this matter. 
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8. Only four Class members have objected to the 
substance of the settlement. The Court has also 
received and considered comments from certain 
privacy organizations. The objectors and 
commentators have criticized the fact that, under 
the Settlement, Class Members do not receive any 
direct monetary compensation. However, the only 
basis for compensation they have addressed at any 
length is that which would proceed from statutory 
damages awards. As discussed above, the 
expectation of such recovery is speculative at best, 
given the inherent and particular litigation risks the 
Class would face in proceeding to trial. If only 
moderate statutory damages were awarded, the 
effect on the fund of incurring administrative costs 
to distribute de minimis amounts per Class Member 
leads to the conclusion that the certainty of the 
Settlement, as constituted, provides more 
meaningful relief to the Class. 
Further, the objectors have suggested that the 
claims in the Harris action were too valuable to be 
released through this Settlement. The Harris 
Plaintiffs, however, now join in the motion for 
approval, having investigated and evaluated this 
Settlement, and following the efforts of Class 
Counsel in this matter to assist the Harris plaintiffs 
in resolving their case against Blockbuster. As this 
Court found in denying the Harris Plaintiffs’ motion 
to intervene prior to Preliminary Approval, 
“[H]aving pursued their own claims against 
Blockbuster relating to these same operative events, 
Proposed Intervenors are already uniquely equipped 
to present informed analysis as to Blockbuster’s 
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potential liability . . . .” Order Denying Motion for 
Leave to Intervene, Dkt. 66. 
Finally, the argument most strongly pressed by the 
objectors and the commentators is that the Privacy 
Foundation created by the Settlement is both 
unnecessary and unduly subject to the influence and 
control of Facebook. Although theoretical efficiencies 
might arise from giving the settlement funds to an 
existing organization rather than by creating a new 
entity, that possibility does undermine the 
conclusion that the Settlement is fair and adequate. 
As to the independence of the Privacy Foundation, 
the objectors’ arguments appear to rest on a premise 
that no aspect of the organization’s structure, and no 
future use of its funds, should in any way be 
potentially consistent with Facebook’s own interests. 
Settlements in litigation very often rest on the 
participants’ abilities to find non-zero sum game 
solutions. Thus, while it likely would be 
inappropriate to apply settlement funds in a manner 
that was solely or primarily for the benefit of the 
defendant, there is no requirement that the funds be 
used in a manner wholly antagonistic to the 
defendant’s interests. In this context, the parties 
have demonstrated that the structure of the Privacy 
Foundation, and the individuals who will be involved 
with it, are sufficient to ensure that the settlement 
funds will be disbursed in a manner that furthers 
the interests of the Class, and the public at large, 
consistent with the interests pursued by plaintiffs in 
this litigation. 
Objectors have not shown there is any substantial 
reason to doubt the independence of two of the three 
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directors. The unanimity requirement for board 
votes is applicable only to structural changes, and 
not to funding decisions. While the director 
associated with Facebook may reasonably be 
expected to exercise his influence against the 
Foundation taking any actions that would clearly 
and directly harm Facebook, there has been no 
persuasive showing that the Foundation will be a 
mere publicity tool for Facebook, or in any 
meaningful sense under Facebook’s direct control. To 
the extent objectors are arguing that that 
Foundation could be structured somewhat 
differently, or that it would be even better for the 
funds to go to some existing organization, such fine-
tuning of the settlement reached by the parties is 
beyond the purview of the Court. “Settlement is the 
offspring of compromise; the question we address is 
not whether the final product could be prettier, 
smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate 
and free from collusion.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1027. 
The fact that only a few Class Members object to the 
proposed settlement further militates in favor of 
approval. In re Mego, 213 F.3d at 459. In addition, 
the fact that an overwhelming majority of the class 
willingly approves a settlement and remains in the 
class also indicates fairness. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 
1027. Here, given only four substantive objections 
and slightly more than 100 opt-outs from over 3.6 
million Class Members, this factor favors a finding of 
fairness, reasonableness and adequacy. 
J. The Court further finds that the Class 
representatives are entitled to and shall receive 
incentive awards for their efforts on behalf of the 
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Class in this litigation and in obtaining this 
Settlement. Class representative Sean Lane shall 
receive an award of $ 10,000.00 due to the 
significant time and effort that he devoted to seeking 
the recovery obtained for the class, representatives 
Mohannaed Sheikha and Sean Martin shall receive 
an award of $ 5000.00 each for their significant time 
and efforts, and the remaining named 
representatives shall receive $ 1,000.00 for their 
efforts and time. 
K. The Court will issue a further order with respect 
to an award of attorney fees and costs. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.  
Dated: 03/17/2010 
/s/ Richard Seeborg 
RICHARD SEEBORG 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., 
et al., Defendants. 
No. C 08-3845 RS 
May 24, 2010, Decided 
May 24, 2010, Filed 
ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The parties negotiated a settlement of this class 
action, which has received final approval after notice 
to the class. Remaining to be decided is the 
application for attorney fees brought by plaintiffs’ 
counsel. The fee motion is unusual, because not only 
does it seek fees for the efforts made by plaintiffs’ 
counsel in this action, it also seeks fees for work 
done by plaintiffs’ counsel in Harris v. Blockbuster, a 
proceeding in the Northern District of Texas arising 
from the same events. The motion fails to establish 
any legitimate grounds for awarding fees for efforts 
undertaken by other attorneys in another case, 
particularly given that those attorneys attempted to 
derail the settlement of this action at the 
preliminary approval stage, before later coming to 
support it. 
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Because the fee request is otherwise reasonable, the 
motion will be granted, but with that portion of the 
fee claim attributable to the Harris counsel excised. 
II. DISCUSSION1 
The parties’ settlement agreement provided that 
plaintiffs’ counsel could apply for, and Facebook 
would not oppose, attorney fees and costs of up to 
one-third of the dollar amount being paid by 
Facebook under the settlement—or roughly $3.17 
million dollars. Counsel has in fact applied for an 
award of fees in the amount of $2.828 million, plus 
costs of $42,210.58.  
Plaintiffs contend that California law governs the fee 
award because their claims sounded in state law. 
See Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co. 
Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (“An award 
of attorneys’ fees incurred in a suit based on state 
substantive law is generally governed by state law.”); 
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (“[b]ecause Washington law governed the 
claim, it also governs the award of fees.”). Here, 
however, plaintiffs asserted both state and federal 
claims, so it is not entirely clear that the fee award 
should be evaluated under state law. As plaintiffs 
acknowledge, however, the approach taken by 
California courts is virtually identical to that taken 
by the Ninth Circuit; under either jurisprudence 
                                            
1 The factual background of this action has been described in 
prior orders and will not be repeated here. 
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the starting point is calculating a “lodestar,” by 
multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent in 
achieving the results obtained by a reasonable 
hourly rate. Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 
1389 (9th Cir. 1995); Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc., 
82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 (2000).2 
Plaintiffs seek a lodestar of $1,161,381.50, 
representing approximately 2500 hours of work, 
distributed among three law firms. Although the 
motion originally was not supported by sufficient 
detail regarding the tasks performed to permit an 
analysis of its reasonableness, plaintiffs 
subsequently submitted an additional declaration as 
well as detailed time records, provided in camera. 
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the 
total time and expenses incurred by plaintiffs’ 
counsel were reasonable in light of the work 
undertaken and the results achieved. The Court has 
further considered the geographic location and 
experience of the attorneys who worked on this 
matter and finds that the hourly rates charged by 
counsel and reflected in the fee application are 
reasonable. Accordingly, the proposed lodestar of 
$1,161,381.50 will be adopted. 
As noted above, the fee application proposes adding 
to this lodestar an amount based on the efforts 
undertaken by the Harris plaintiffs’ counsel in that 
action. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that Harris 
                                            
2 Plaintiffs assert that there is greater latitude in applying a 
multiplier to the lodestar under state law than federal, but 
they argue their request here is proper under either. 
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counsel incurred a lodestar of approximately 
$825,000, and they advocate allocating 30% of that 
as a basis to increase the lodestar in this action to a 
little over $1.4 million. Plaintiffs offer no authority 
to support this novel suggestion. Even assuming that 
Harris counsel’s efforts resulted in benefits to 
persons who are class members here as well as in 
that case, counsel must seek compensation for those 
efforts in the action in which they took place. Indeed, 
the only efforts Harris counsel undertook in this case 
were directed at preventing preliminary approval of 
the settlement. While Harris counsel may have 
believed at the time that those efforts were in the 
interests of the class, they cannot expect to be paid 
from the settlement funds for opposing the 
settlement, particularly since they ultimately 
supported the settlement, with no material changes 
in its terms. 
The final issue is what multiplier, if any, should be 
applied to the lodestar. With the inclusion of the 
Harris counsel’s hours in the lodestar, plaintiffs 
argue for a multiplier of 2, which they describe as 
“reasonable and warranted.” Plaintiffs suggest, 
however, that if the Court is not inclined to include 
the Harris hours in the lodestar, then it should apply 
a multiplier of 2.4, to reach the same total fee award. 
The Court is satisfied that application of a multiplier 
is warranted under the circumstances here. See In re 
Washington Public Power Supply System Securities 
Litigation, 19 F.3d 1291, 1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1994). 
Plaintiffs’ suggestion, however, to apply a 2.4 
multiplier as a means to ensure the same result as if 
the Harris hours were included in the lodestar is 
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disturbingly cynical. Having concluded that those 
hours should not be compensated in this action as 
part of the lodestar, the Court will not provide 
compensation for those hours by labeling it as 
something else. Accordingly, a multiplier of 2 will be 
applied. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The motion for an award of attorney fees and costs is 
granted in part. Plaintiffs’ counsel shall recover from 
the settlement funds attorney fees of $2,322,763.00 
and costs of $42,210.58, for a total award of 
$2,364,973.58. 
Dated: May 24, 2010 
 
/s/ Richard Seeborg 
RICHARD SEEBORG 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
SEAN LANE, et al., Plaintiffs v. FACEBOOK, INC., 
et al., Defendants. 
No. C 08-3845 RS 
May 27, 2010, Decided 
May 27, 2010, Filed 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Pursuant to this Court’s Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Approving 
Settlement of March 17, 2010 (the “Final Approval 
Order”) and Order re Attorneys’ Fees of May 24, 
2010 (the “Attorneys’ Fees Order”), which are 
incorporated herin by reference, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED THAT: 
A. This Judgment incorporates by reference the 
definitions of the Settlement Agreement dated as of 
September 17, 2009 (the “Settlement Agreement”), 
and all defined terms used herein shall have the 
same meanings as set forth in the Settlement 
Agreement. 
B. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 
there is no just reason for delay and final judgment 
is entered as to all defendants in the Litigation. 
C. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 
this Court hereby affirms its findings and 
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conclusions, set forth in the Preliminary Approval 
and Notice Order as well as its Final Approval Order 
that, for purposes of the Settlement Agreement and 
Settlement, this Class meets the prerequisites for 
maintenance of a class action under Rule 23. The 
Court hereby makes final its previously conditional 
certification of the Class. 
D. The Court finds that, during the course of the 
Litigation, the Parties and their respective counsel 
at all times complied with the requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and that the 
Settlement Agreement is the product of good-faith 
negotiations. 
E. This Court, having approved the Settlement, 
having found the Settlement to be fair, reasonable, 
and adequate in all respects for the Class pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e), having 
found the Settlement Agreement and the Settlement 
to be fair, reasonable and adequate as to the Parties, 
and granting final approval of the Settlement 
Agreement and the Settlement in all respects, 
hereby directs the Parties to peform the terms of the 
Settlement Agreement. 
F. As to all Protected Persons, this Court hereby 
dismisses the Litigation in its entirety with 
prejudice and without costs (except as otherwise 
expressly provided in the Settlement Agreement and 
by other order of the Court). 
G.Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Judgment 
does not dismiss any of the individual claims 
asserted by any persons or entities, identified in 
Exhibit A to the Court’s Final Approval Order (Dkt. 
No. 123, p. 12), who validly and timely requested 
-App. 70- 
exclusion from the Settlement Class as provided for 
in the Preliminary Approval and Notice Order, and 
persons so identified shall not share in the benefits 
of the Settlement. In addition, this Final Judgment 
does not affect their legal rights to pursue any 
claims they may have against Defendants. With 
regard to all other members of the Class, such Class 
Members are hereinafter barred and permanently 
enjoined from prosecuting further the Released 
Claims against Protected Persons. 
H. As set forth in paragraphs 5.1-5.4 of the 
Settlement Agreement, upon the Effective Date, the 
Representative Plaintiffs and each and every one of 
the Class Members shall be deemed to have and by 
operation of this Judgment shall have fully, finally, 
and forever released, relinquished, and discharged 
the Protected Persons from all Released Claims. 
I. Neither Class Counsel’s application for attorneys’ 
fees and reimbursement of expenses nor any order 
entered by this Court thereon, including the 
Attorneys’ Fees Order, shall in any way disturb or 
affect this Judgment, and all such matters shall be 
construed separately from this Judgment. 
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the Litgation, 
there shall be no claims or awards of any costs, 
attorneys’ fees, or expense to be paid by Class 
Counsel or from the Settlement Fund except as 
expressly set forth in the orders of this Court. 
J. Neither the Settlement Agreement nor the 
Settlement nor any act performed or document 
executed pursuant to or in furtherance of the 
Settlement Agreement or the Settlement: (i) is or 
may be deemed to be or may be used as an admission 
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of, or evidence of, the validity of any Released 
Claims, of any wrongdoing or liability of Protected 
Persons, or a finding or evidence that any claims 
that either were brought or could have been brought 
in the Litigation are appropriate for class treatment 
or that any requirement for class certification is or 
could otherwise be satisfied; or (ii) is or may be 
deemed to be or may be used as an admission of, or 
evidence of, any fault or omission of Protected 
Persons in any civil, criminal, or administrative 
proceeding in any court, administrative agency, or 
other tribunal. 
K. Protected Persons may file this Judgment and/or 
the Settlement Agreement from this action in any 
other action that may be brought against them in 
order to support a defense or counterclaim based on 
principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, 
good-faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or 
any theory of claim preclusion or issue preclusion or 
similar defense or counterclaim. Protected Persons 
may rely on this Judgment and/or the Settlement 
Agreement from this action to seek a dismissal of 
any claim brought against Facebook or any of the 
Protected Persons, in any court whatsoever, which 
derives from the Released Claims. 
L. Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in 
any way, this Court hereby retains continuing 
jurisdiction over (i) implementation of the 
Settlement; (ii) distribution or disposition of the 
Settlement Fund; (iii) further proceedings, if 
necessary, on applications for attorneys’ fees, 
expenses, and costs in connection with the Litigation 
and the Settlement; and (d) the parties for the 
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purpose of construing, enforcing and administering 
the Settlement Agreement. 
IT IS SO ORDERED 
Dated: May 27, 2010 
 
/s/ Richard Seeborg 
RICHARD SEEBORG 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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United States Court of Appeals 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
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JUDGES: Before: Procter Hug, Jr., Andrew J. 
Kleinfeld, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges. 





Judges Hug and W. Fletcher have voted to deny 
appellants’ petitions for rehearing. Judge Kleinfeld 
has voted to grant the petitions for rehearing. Judge 
W. Fletcher has voted to deny the petitions for 
rehearing en banc and Judge Hug has so 
recommended. Judge Kleinfeld would grant the 
petitions for rehearing en banc. 
The full court was advised of the petitions for 
rehearing en banc. A judge of the court requested a 
vote on en banc rehearing. The matter failed to 
receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused 
active judges in favor of en banc consideration. Fed. 
R. App. P. 35. 
The petitions for rehearing and the petitions for 
rehearing en banc are DENIED. Judge M. Smith’s 




M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom KOZINSKI, 
Chief Judge, and O'SCANNLAIN, BYBEE, BEA, and 
IKUTA, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc: 
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Class action litigants are increasingly likely to 
employ the doctrine of cy pres to settle complex class 
actions.1 Until recently, courts in our circuit were 
well-positioned to address the issues associated with 
this trend because our cy pres jurisprudence was 
clear. Under a line of cases beginning with Six (6) 
Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 
F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990), we required that a cy pres 
award (1) be reasonably certain to benefit the class, 
and (2) advance the objectives of the statutes relied 
upon in bringing suit. See also Nachshin v. AOL, 
LLC, 663 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); Dennis v. 
Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012). By 
approving a settlement that fails both criteria, 
however, the majority in this case creates a 
significant loophole in our case law that will confuse 
litigants and judges, while endorsing cy pres 
settlements that in no way benefit class members. I 
therefore respectfully dissent from our unfortunate 
failure to rehear this case en banc. 
I. 
We require district judges to be reasonably certain 
that class members will benefit before approving a cy 
pres settlement. Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d 
at 1308. We have counseled that the “choice of 
charity and its relation to the class members and 
class claims—or lack thereof—figure[s] heavily in 
                                            
1 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and 
Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 620 (2010) (discussing 
the “dramatic turn in modern class actions toward the use of cy 
pres relief”). 
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our analysis.” Dennis, 697 F.3d at 865 (emphasis 
added). Thus, we have rejected settlements where 
the selected charity lacks “a substantial record of 
service” in remedying the types of wrongs alleged, or 
where the selected charity is not sufficiently “limited 
in its choice of projects” to ensure that class 
members will truly be benefitted by its works. Id. 
(quoting Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1308). 
The majority, however, failed to apply these 
safeguards. 
First, the selected cy pres beneficiary, the Digital 
Trust Foundation (DTF), has no record of service. 
Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 
2012). The “charity” is simply a bespoke creation of 
this settlement. The majority is apparently 
untroubled by this. It attempts to distinguish our 
case law emphasizing the importance of a charity's 
record of service by noting that in those cases “there 
was no way of knowing whether the organization 
would use the funds to the benefit of class members,” 
while here “the settlement agreement and DTF's 
Articles of Incorporation tell us exactly how funds 
will be used.” Lane, 696 F.3d at 822. Respectfully, 
they do no such thing. 
The DTF has made a written commitment to “fund 
and sponsor programs designed to educate users, 
regulators[,] and enterprises regarding critical issues 
relating to protection of identity and personal 
information online through user control, and the 
protection of users from online threats.” Id. However 
one might describe this mission statement, “limited” 
is not the word that comes to mind. See, e.g., Dennis, 
697 F.3d at 865. DTF promises to fund and sponsor 
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“programs” that address “critical issues” relating to 
Internet privacy. But neither the “programs” nor the 
“issues” are defined with any specificity, and 
certainly not the specificity necessary to be 
reasonably certain that class members will actually 
benefit from these activities. 
Frequent NPR listeners know that the MacArthur 
Foundation's open-ended mission statement 
indicates that it is “committed to building a more 
just, verdant, and peaceful world.” MacArthur 
Foundation, http://www.macfound.org/about (last 
visited February 18, 2013). But that is no guarantee 
that a donation to the MacArthur Foundation will 
actually result in, or advance, justice, verdancy, or 
peace. Rather, a potential donor must look to other 
factors, such as the MacArthur Foundation’s past 
record of service or its specific list of projects, to 
determine whether it is reasonably certain that a 
donation will truly bring about the promised effects. 
That the DTF is committed to funding “programs” 
regarding “critical issues” says absolutely nothing 
about whether class members will truly benefit from 
this settlement; it simply promises that DTF will do 
some “stuff” regarding some more “critical stuff.” If 
fashioning an open-ended, one-sentence mission 
statement is all it takes to earn cy pres settlement 
approval in our court, we have completely 





The majority also undercuts our precedent requiring 
cy pres money to be spent in a manner that advances 
the “objectives of the underlying statutes.” Nachshin, 
663 F.3d at 1036. But DTF’s receipt of these 
settlement funds, even if unobjectionable in all other 
respects, simply does not advance the objectives of 
the statutes upon which plaintiffs relied in their 
suit. 
Here, the plaintiffs brought claims under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2510; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1030; the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2710; the California Consumer Legal 
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750; and the 
California Computer Crime Law, Cal. Penal Code  
§ 502. With the exception of the California Consumer 
Legal Remedies Act, these statutes all share a 
common purpose—preventing the unauthorized 
access or disclosure of private information. Yet the 
DTF's sole stated purpose is to “educate users, 
regulators[,] and enterprises” on how to protect 
Internet privacy “through user control.” Lane, 696 
F.3d at 822 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ claims, 
however, have nothing to do with users’ lack of 
“education” or “control.” Instead, they relate to 
misconduct by Internet companies that wrongfully 
exposes private information in ways that even 
educated users cannot anticipate, prevent, or direct. 
Our precedent holds that it is not enough simply to 
identify any link between the class claims and a cy 
pres distribution, such as whether both concern food 
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(Dennis) or the Internet (Lane). Instead, an 
appropriate cy pres recipient must be dedicated to 
protecting consumers from the precise wrongful 
conduct about which plaintiffs complain. See Dennis, 
697 F.3d at 867. But an organization that focuses on 
protecting privacy solely through “user control” can 
never prevent unauthorized access or disclosure of 
private information where the alleged wrongdoer 
already has unfettered access to a user’s records. 
The DTF can teach Facebook users how to create 
strong passwords, tinker with their privacy settings, 
and generally be more cautious online, but it can't 
teach users how to protect themselves from 
Facebook’s deliberate misconduct. Unless of course 
the DTF teaches Facebook users not to use 
Facebook. That seems unlikely. 
I regret the muddle this case makes of our cy pres 
jurisprudence, and I respectfully dissent from our 
failure to rehear this case en banc. 
  
 
 
